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Abstract 
 This dissertation looks at the relationship between American subnational governments 
and clean air policy in three different cases. I investigate the impact of state reduction policies on 
the emission of Greenhouse emissions, the subnational adoption of Greenhouse Gas tracking and 
reduction policies, and the impact of Clean Air Act standards on the siting of coal-fired power 
plants. The major finding is that in both the adoption and business response to these policies, a 
state’s political context can limit its ability to regulate air pollution. These factors contribute to 
the unequal protection of air quality across the United States.  
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Introduction 
It strikes me that much of our country's ongoing efforts to clean up air pollution is about 
playing fair, and doing our share. In my home state of Delaware, we've done our homework and 
worked hard and, as a result, we've made great strides in cleaning up our own air pollution. 
Unfortunately, a number of the upwind states to the west of us have not made the same 
commitment to reducing harmful pollution by investing in cleaner air. Some of those states have 
even built taller smokestacks so their pollution would fall -- not on them -- but on downwind 
states like us, keeping their air clean while making our air dirty, polluting our environment and 
making our children sick.
 1
- Senator Tom Carter 
Currently, air quality governance in the United States is a complex system that involves 
multiple layers of government regulating a vast portion of all economic sectors.  Despite major 
decreases among many major air pollutants over the last thirty-five years, many scholars and 
public officials debated the role of certain governmental entities in maximizing reductions. As 
mentioned in the above quotation, state governments can and have played a major part in this 
regulatory structure. However, there has been concern over the capacity of states to combat this 
problem when air pollution is a complex problem that does not respect geo-political borders.  
 Even with the large role state governments currently play in the regulation of air quality, 
traditionally the federal government has made regulatory decisions concerning only some 
pollutants. Major changes occurred in the last thirty-five years over whether state or federal 
governments should regulate and what emissions should be regulated. Gradually, subnational 
governments became much more involved in this regulatory structure.  While initially the federal 
government played a central regulatory role with the Clean Air Act of 1970 (CAA), in the 
Eighties and Nineties, states began to play a larger part in the regulation of criteria pollutants. 
Over time, definitions of clean air shifted to include even more pollutants. Originally, the CAA 
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mandated that the federal government regulate six criteria pollutants: carbon monoxide, ozone, 
particulate matter (first PM 10 and later PM 2.5), nitrogen oxides, lead, and sulfur dioxide. 
However, attitudes shifted towards a concern for global climate change and the Supreme Court 
ruled that the EPA should regulate greenhouse gases (GHGs) (carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, and 
methane) under the auspices of the CAA (see: Massachusetts v. EPA).  
The federal and state regulatory environment for some pollutants remained uneven for 
many decades. While the CAA addressed many major air pollutants, the law did not regulate 
GHGs. There was major debate about the United States joining the Kyoto Protocol in the 
Nineties, but the federal government did not make major changes to its regulatory regime 
concerning greenhouse gas emissions until the 2010s. In absence of a concrete federal climate 
policy, many states adopted different policies to mitigate GHG pollutants, promote the 
development of renewable energy sources, and other ideal policy outcomes. 
 I argue that the optimism expressed by scholars overstates the ability of states to regulate 
air quality. There are several limitations in the adoption and implementation of air quality 
policies, and industry may adjust its economic behavior to negatively impact the environment or 
ignore certain state air quality regulations. Similar to Senator Carter’s implicit suggestion in the 
opening quotation: the efforts that states take to protect air quality have been unequal.  
The underlying justification for this argument is that state adoption of clean air policy 
varies by state and largely depends on the internal politics of certain states over other factors, 
which limits the scope of the collective response to air pollution. Also, economic forces can 
respond to regulations by migrating to those states with lower clean air standards or may ignore 
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efforts by states to improve air quality. Therefore, some of these policies are only symbols to 
appease constituents who wish to mitigate the factors that contribute to climate change.  
To support this argument, I investigate different parts of subnational clean air policy 
through three chapters. Specifically, chapter one looks at the state factors that influenced the 
adoption of three different state climate change policies. Previous policy literature on policy 
diffusion and the internal determinants literature attempts to explain the adoption of policy 
across a federalist system based on internal and external state factors, such as state economic and 
political conditions. Using Event History Analysis to evaluate EPA adoption data from 2001 to 
2010, the major finding is that states with more liberal citizens were more likely to adopt policies 
to track, mitigate, and establish reduction goals. This unequal policy adoption shows the 
importance of climate change politics in policy change. Other factors, such as scope of the 
problem, learning from other states, and the potential for renewable energy, and economic 
conditions, were less consistent in their impact on change.  
With states adopting differing standards for air pollution, businesses act strategically to 
unequal air quality policy. In chapter two, I investigate how utility companies responded to states 
with more stringent Clean Air Act standards through the siting of coal-fired power plants. Past 
literature on the “Race-to-the-Bottom” hypothesis finds inconclusive evidence as to whether 
businesses site facilities within states with less stringent environmental standards to maximize 
profits. In an attempt to improve on this literature, I look at the permitting behavior of utility 
companies and coal-fired power plants.  Using Negative Binomial and Ordinary Least Squares 
statistical analysis to evaluate the relationship between the number and size of each new source 
of coal application and state air policy and political conditions from 1999 to 2009, this study 
finds that utility companies tended to site facilities in states with more conservative populations 
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and less stringent regulations. Utilities were less likely to build in more liberal states with more 
restrictive standards.  
States can change their behavior in response to certain clean air regulations, but they can 
also outright ignore other state policies. Chapter three explores the impact of state GHG 
reduction targets on the output of facility pollution. Many states adopted state GHG targets to 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions, and past scholars indicate that these policies produce modest 
reductions. However, there is reason to suspect that these policies have little impact on 
emissions. Using data from the Greenhouse Gas Report Program (GHGRP) and the Center for 
Climate and Energy Solutions (C2es) from 2010 to 2013, I create an ambitiousness index to 
evaluate whether more ambitious targets reduce carbon dioxide emissions at both the state and 
facility level. The evidence suggests that that states with more ambitious GHG targets did not 
reduce more carbon dioxide emissions. However, states with less carbon dioxide emissions were 
more likely to adopt more ambitious GHG targets in the first place.  
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Chapter 1: Greenhouse Policy adoption 
Greenhouse Policy adoption: The diffusion and/or internal determinants of three 
subnational climate change policies 
Over the past decade, some state-level officials began to express concern over the growth 
of Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions in the United States and the inaction of the federal 
government to address the problem of anthropogenic climate change. As of 2005, U.S. GHG 
emissions were up 16.3% from 1990 emission levels, most of which originated from electricity 
generation, transportation, and industry (Wheeler 2008). As a result of the failure of the federal 
government to take drastic legislative and executive policy steps to diminish these carbon 
dioxide emissions, subnational governments began to construct a patchwork of GHG policies. 
The most commonly utilized policies were through GHG climate inventories, action plans, and 
reduction targets.
2
 Most of those involved in the creation of these policies indicated that a moral 
imperative drove them to combat climate change through subnational action (Wheeler 2008). 
Through these policies, states attempted to change public and private economic behavior in 
energy, transportation, and industrial development, which they viewed as contributing to the 
problem of anthropogenic climate change.  
This dissertation chapter investigates the entirety of the state climate policy niche through 
the adoption of three state climate change policies.
3
  Each policy addressed different parts of the 
problem: climate inventories measure the amount of state GHGs, climate action plans analyze 
ways to reduce GHGs throughout a state’s economy, and climate reduction plans establish 
timelines for reducing these emissions.  This chapter ultimately seeks to address the following 
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 Often these policies are referred to as Climate Action Plans. However, since this study dissects these 
policies into three different components,  one of which is a plan of specific actions to mitigate climate 
change, for sake of clarity, collectively these  are referred to “GHG tracking and reduction policies” to 
refer to these three major subnational policies 
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questions:  1) do state political and economic factors influence the rate of adoption of these 
policies, or 2) do external state factors, such as regional and neighbor adoption rates, matter?  I 
use internal determinants and policy diffusion theory (Berry and Berry 1990) to examine the 
speed of adoption of each of these GHG tracking and reduction policies and answer these 
questions.  
The approach of this chapter is necessary for theoretical and empirical reasons.  First, 
previous literature only analyzes the adoption of one climate change policy at a time. While 
previous scholars investigate the factors that influence the adoption of climate change policies 
like Renewable Portfolio Standards, Net Metering, et cetera (Carley and Miller 2012), often 
these policies are only one component of the climate change policy field. Second, the 
methodological approach of scholars who investigate climate change policies is limited.  Finally, 
previous analysis ignores the adoption of these GHG tracking and reduction policies and the 
relationship between them. The advantages of comparing these three policies are:  1) they are 
often adopted together, 2) they span across sectors that contribute to climate change, and 3) there 
is variation across states in the adoption of all three policies.  
Using adoption data from the EPA spanning from 2001 to 2010, this study finds, 
consistent with past research, that internal state politics play the largest influence in adoption of 
all three climate governance policies. The evidence suggests that the policies that develop, track, 
solutions, and create goals are more likely to be adopted as a result of a more liberal state 
citizenry. Additionally, states with more conservative citizens are more likely to adopt no 
policies or only Greenhouse Gas inventories. Conversely, states with more liberal citizens are 
more likely to adopt all three climate policies.  
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This chapter first discusses the diffusion and internal determinants theories of policy 
adoption. Secondly, it explores the literature concerning state climate policies. Thirdly, it 
evaluates the variables that influence the adoption of these climate change policies, and finally 
discusses the empirical results and implications. 
Literature review 
 
Diffusion and Internal Determinants  
 
 Theoretical and empirical studies in the policy diffusion literature established that both 
internal and external factors influence the adoption of subnational policies. Initially, public 
policy studies addressed the speed of adoption of similar policies across subnational 
governments in the United States (Walker 1969). Subsequent studies continued to clarify the 
theory in order to separate and further understand the internal and external dynamics in this 
process (Berry and Berry 1990). Internal determinants literature sought to determine if political, 
economic, problem severity or any other internal state factors push states to adopt certain 
policies. The diffusion of innovation literature investigated outside factors such as neighboring 
and regional state influences or external factors in the adoption of policy. However, more 
recently, many scholars have made efforts to combine both external and internal factors into a 
single framework to explain policy adoption across numerous subnational policies (see: 
Barrilleaux and Miller 1988; Haider-Markel 2001; Hays and Glick 1997). Currently, a 
proliferation of literature using both of these theories explains the adoption emerging subnational 
climate change policies.  
Subnational Climate Change Policies 
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The two aforementioned theoretical frameworks have been fruitfully applied to the 
question of subnational climate change policies.  Climate change policies attempt to mitigate the 
factors contributing to anthropogenic climate change to encourage a market transition away from 
traditionally carbon-dioxide intensive economic sectors (like oil, natural gas, and coal) to 
“cleaner” renewable energy sources (wind, solar, biodiesel, etc.). Scholars investigated different 
climate policies, such as Net Metering (Stoutenborough and Beverlin 2008), Renewable 
Portfolio Standards (Lyon and Yin 2008; Coley and Hess 2012; Fowler and Breen 2013; 
Matisoff 2008), Property-Assessed Clean Energy (Coley and Hess 2012), and Sustainable 
Energy Portfolios (Chandler 2009), and other policies seeking to assist in this energy transition. 
Other policies include investigating building efficiency to reduce the consumption of energy 
from buildings, direct caps on carbon dioxide emissions and other policy goals. Essentially, these 
groups of policies seek to minimize carbon dioxide emissions from the energy, transportation, 
and buildings sectors.  
Previous research indicates mixed results concerning climate change policy adoption by 
emphasizing the role of internal state economic and political factors over regional or neighboring 
effects. Matisoff (2008) finds that the adoption of Renewable Energy Portfolios depends on 
citizen ideology instead of regional or neighboring adoption effects (Matisoff 2008). 
Stoutenborough and Beverlin (2008) find that Net Metering policies diffused in patterns based 
on the EPA region of previous adopters, which suggests that geography does matter in the 
adoption of new clean energy/climate change policies. 
There are two main problems with this literature. First, most of these scholars only 
address the adoption of specific energy policies, which only focus on a narrow portion of a 
spectrum of climate change policies. To address the internal and external factors influencing 
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climate policy, scholars must address policies that cross multiple economic sectors, due to the 
complexity of each in attempting to mitigate the factors that contribute to climate change. 
Second, previous climate change scholarship that attempts to explain the entire climate 
change niche suffers from methodological problems. Matisoff (2008) provides some evidence for 
the political and economic factors in the adoption of an aggregated total of climate change 
policies (GHG tracking and reduction policies included). However, he does not incorporate 
internal and external factors into a single framework. Instead, his study only addresses internal 
factors and fails to address external ones, primarily because the aggregation of these policies 
prevents the use of time sensitive variables which measure for effects like neighborhood and 
regional diffusion effects. Additionally, Matisoff (2008) treats each of these policies as equal to 
one another, although certain factors may be more important for some policies and less for 
others.  This chapter disaggregates these policies by focusing on three GHG tracking and 
reduction policies in separate statistical models and compares the influence of each factor on 
their adoption. 
 In this chapter, I overcome these problems by first combining internal and external 
factors into the same statistical models. Second, I do not look only at one climate change policy, 
but instead I address three climate tracking and reduction policies which is representative of a 
state’s effort to address climate change.  This allows me to compare and contrast policies that 
involve all economic sectors, but with divergent climate mitigation policy goals.  
GHG Tracking and Reduction Policies  
 
In the past decade, state officials adopted three broad interrelated policies for state 
climate change mitigation: GHG Inventories, GHG action plans, and GHG reduction targets. 
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These three mitigation policies are built upon the principles of calculating emissions, adopting 
targets, developing policies, implementing measures, and monitoring results (Pollak et al. 2011). 
First, states develop ways to calculate and track GHG emissions through GHG inventories. 
Using software from the Center for Climate Strategies, inventories set-up data collection 
mechanisms, and quantify GHG emissions by a state’s economic sectors and sources (Lutsey and 
Sperling 2008). These policies collect specific GHG emissions, identify sectors and activities 
that emit pollutants, and track progress in reducing emissions (“Greenhouse Gas Inventories” 
2014).
4
 Adopted widely around the U.S., thirty-one states have adopted GHG inventories 
between 2002 and 2010.  For some Southern states, like Oklahoma and Texas, who are reluctant 
to adopt other climate change policies, this is the only reduction and tracking policy adopted by 
these states.   
Second, states adopted GHG action plans. Developed by governing state parties, major 
regional business interests, and environmental organizations, these plans generally include 
specific proposals or plans to develop and implement change mitigation, which often includes 
utilities, land use, building codes, transportation, taxation, environmental programs, and other 
policy areas (“Climate Action Plans” 2014; Pollak et al. 2011). Pollak et al. (2011) indicate that 
the most common strategies consist of improving building efficiency, the promotion of 
renewable energy, and modification of forests and soils. Most surveyed climate action plan 
participants indicate that these strategies were better for promoting economic opportunities and 
                                                          
4 These inventories are separate from the Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases 
Rule of 2009, which mandates that the EPA gather emissions data for the National Greenhouse 
Gas Inventory (Cook 2013). 
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less likely to produce economic and environmental risks. Thirty-two states have adopted action 
plans between 2002 and 2010.   
Finally, states can adopt climate reduction targets. These policies set emissions targets for 
the state to reach by a certain year compared to a baseline year (Drummond 2010). States may 
set targets based on entire sectors or specific economic sectors. These goals may be either 
voluntary reductions or mandatory ones. For example, in 2006, California adopted a statewide 
cap on emissions at 1990 levels by 2020, which mandated sector-wide emission reductions.
5
 
Normally, these targets are embedded within climate action plans for specific goals and targets 
for states to meet. However, not every state adopts a mitigation goal. Only twenty states have 
adopted GHG reduction between 2001 and 2009.  
Often state agencies, such as departments of environmental protection, air quality 
agencies, and governors’ offices take the lead in the development of these policies. Many 
different stakeholders partake in an advisory group which either creates or assists in the 
construction of these policies (Wheeler 2008). As indicated in Table 1, while some states adopt 
all three policies to achieve these goals, others adopt only one or two. 
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Table 1: Adoption Dates for Each Climate Change Policies (source: EPA) 
    
State Inventory Action Plan Emission Goals 
Alabama X X X 
Alaska 2008 2009 X 
Arizona 2006 2006 2006 
Arkansas 2008 2008 X 
California 2007 2006 2005 
Colorado 2007 2007 2008 
Connecticut 2006 2005 2008 
Delaware X X X 
Florida 2008 2008 2007 
Georgia X X X 
Hawaii 2003 X 2007 
Idaho X X X 
Illinois 2007 2007 2007 
Indiana X X X 
Iowa 2011 2008 X 
Kansas 2008 2011 X 
Kentucky X 2011 X 
Louisiana X X X 
Maine X 2004 2003 
Maryland X 2008 2009 
Massachusetts 2009 2004 2008 
Michigan 2005 2007 2009 
Minnesota 2008 2008 2007 
Mississippi X X X 
Missouri X X X 
Montana 2008 2007 X 
Nebraska X X X 
Nevada 2008 X X 
New 
Hampshire 
X 2009 2002 
New Jersey 2008 2008 2007 
New Mexico 2006 2006 2005 
New York 2008 2009 2002 
North Carolina X 2008 X 
North Dakota X X X 
Ohio 2011 2011 X 
Oklahoma 2002 X X 
Oregon X 2011 2007 
Pennsylvania 2006 2009 X 
13 
 
Rhode Island X 2002 2002 
South Carolina X 2008 X 
South Dakota 2007 X X 
Tennessee X X X 
Texas 2002 X X 
Utah 2007 2007 X 
Vermont 2007 2007 2006 
Virginia 2008 2008 X 
Washington 2007 2008 2007 
West Virginia 2003 X X 
Wisconsin 2007 2008 X 
Wyoming X X X 
Total 30 32 20 
 
Figure 1: Number of state Climate Policies 
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Climate Tracking and Reduction Scholarship 
 
Although much is known about state climate tracking and reduction policies, surprisingly 
no research has examined the adoption of these policies. Of those scholars who investigate 
specific climate change policies, most only address the details and impact of the GHG tracking 
and reduction policies. Lutsey et al. (2008) explains some of the minutiae surrounding these 
three policies, including state adoption at the time and information about each policy. Gallivan et 
al (2011) investigates the flaws in current GHG inventories, action and reduction plans in 
achieving planned outcomes and the divergence of results. Others notice the positive impact of 
the adoption of one or more of these policies and find that states that adopt these policies 
produce modest reductions across state commercial and transportation sectors (Drummond 
2010).  
Despite vast information on some climate change policies, existing literature fails to 
explore the adoption of state GHG tracking and reduction policies. While Matisoff (2008) 
aggregates GHG tracking and reduction policies into an amalgamated measure of state adoption 
of climate change policies, the methodology fails to capture the variation of adoption patterns 
and, because of temporal constraints, does not incorporate post-2005 adoption of these policies. 
This is especially problematic when a majority of states adopted climate action plans (27 out of 
32 states), GHG inventories (25 out of 30 states) and reduction policies (15 out of 20 states) 
between 2006 and 2010. Further investigation that includes adoption analysis provides a fuller 
picture of the development and impact of these policies.   
The limitations of the scholarship at the state level are overcome by city-level 
scholarship. Scholars explore the municipal policies of Green Building Policies (Kontokosta 
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2011) and climate action plans (Bassett and Shandas 2010; Tang et al. 2010; Krause 2011a;  
Krause 2011b). Plenty of urban policy scholars provide empirical evidence and details 
surrounding city level climate action plans (Bassett and Shandas 2010; Tang et al. 2010; Krause 
2011a; Krause 2011b).  Krause (2011) links city and state action plans through multi-level 
analysis to determine the influence of state characteristics and adoption of GHG reduction target 
and climate action plans on a city’s adoption of a Climate Protection Agreement.  While analysis 
of the adoption of climate action plan scholarship is mainly limited to city level, this analysis 
provides a methodological foundation for a state level approach. 
Dataset, Methods, and Variables 
This chapter includes a cross-sectional time-series dataset and analyzes the factors that 
influence the adoption of these three different subnational climate change policies between 2001 
and 2010, since most states began and ended the adoption process during this period.
 67
 Similar 
to previous research on the influence of subnational adoption of policies at the state level (see: 
Berry and Berry 2007), this chapter uses Event History Analysis to statistically analyze the state 
adoption of each GHG tracking and reduction policy.  
Dependent variables 
 
The major dependent variables in this study are the adoption dates of these three policies. 
The EPA chronicled the adoption of subnational GHG action plans (“Climate Action Plants” 
2014), GHG inventories (“Greenhouse Gas Inventories” 2014), and GHG reduction targets 
(Greenhouse Gas Emission Targets” 2014).  Thirty states adopted a GHG inventory, thirty-two 
                                                          
6
 There have been two waves for climate action plans. Most scholarly attention investigates the second wave. This is 
for good reason because most state funding and planning occurred in this second way (Wheeler 2008).  
6
 The year 2011 had to be dropped from the analysis due temporal constraints of the citizen ideology measure. 
However, only Ohio’s adoption of GHG inventory is dropped from the analysis. 
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adopted a climate action plan, and twenty adopted emission targets. Fourteen states adopted all 
three plans, while eleven adopted none. Those who adopted partial plans either decided to only 
adopt GHG inventories (5 total) or adopt inventories and action plans but no emission goals (10 
total). 
Independent Variables 
 
 I analyze the internal and external state variables that influence state adoption of policies.   
External variables consist of whether neighboring or regional states adopted these policies, as 
well as the ideological distance of previous state adopters. Internal state factors should also play 
an additional role in adoption; therefore, state characteristics, such as citizen ideology, partisan 
type of governor, level of gross state product, carbon dioxide emissions, and renewable energy 
potential should affect adoption, which are most commonly used in the climate change policy 
and diffusion literatures.  
Hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis #1: States neighboring adopters of climate change action plans, GHG inventories, 
and reduction targets are more likely to adopt these policies.  
 As previously mentioned, traditional diffusion literature identifies that states that border 
other states that adopt a policy are more likely to adopt that policy. Using data acquired from 
adoption year of states along with percentage of state adopters on a state’s border by year.  
Hypothesis #2: States in the same EPA region of the adopters of climate change action plans, 
GHG inventories, and reduction targets are more likely to adopt these policies.  
17 
 
Similar to measures of neighborhood diffusion, adoption of subnational climate change 
and energy policies is often associated with regional diffusion variables.  Stoutenborough and 
Beverlin (2008) notice patterns of regional diffusion of environmental and energy policies based 
on whether or not states are in the same EPA region. Using data acquired from adoption year of 
states along with EPA region maps, this study I create a variable that shows the percentage of 
state adopters in a state’s EPA region by year.  
Hypothesis #3:  States similar in government ideology to adopters of climate change action 
plans, GHG inventories, and reduction targets are more likely to adopt these policies.  
I measure the ideological distance between previous adopters and the state in question. 
Grossback et al. (2004) argues that when a state adopts a policy, it sends a signal to other states 
about the position of that policy on the ideological spectrum. The closer a state is ideologically to 
previous state adopters the more likely they are to adopt the same policy than those further away. 
A variable similar to Grossback (2004) is constructed based on the state government ideological 
scores developed by Berry and Berry (1998) and adoption patterns of GHG tracking and 
reduction policies.  
Hypothesis #5:  States with more liberal citizenry are more likely to adopt climate change action 
plans, GHG inventories, and reduction goals.  
Research indicates that citizen ideology is a major influence on the adoption of 
subnational climate change policies (Matisoff 2008). The more liberal the public, the more likely 
states produce policies to respond to climate change policy due to an ideological belief in the role 
of government to intervene in the economy to achieve certain goals. I use the revised 1960 to 
2010 citizen ideological series (Berry et al. 1998) between 2002 and 2010.  
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Hypothesis #6:  States with Democratic governors are more likely to adopt climate change 
action plans, GHG inventories, and reduction goals.  
As many states rely on the executive branch to write and implement all three of these 
policies, the party identification of the sitting governor should matter in adoption. Previous 
scholars indicate states with Democratic governors support pro-environmental policy (Lester 
1980). States with Republican governors should be less likely than Democratic ones to adopt 
these policies due to ideological preferences concerning the role of government in solving 
environmental problems. The data used in this study includes the party of the governor between 
2001 and 2010.  
Hypothesis #7: States with higher Gross state product (GSP) are more likely to adopt climate 
change action plans, GHG inventories, and reduction goals.  
Previous studies of bureaucracies indicate that resources play a key role in a state’s 
decision to innovate (Mohr 1969). While Matisoff (2008) finds no evidence that state financial 
resources influence the adoption of Renewable Energy Portfolio Standards and energy efficiency 
programs. However, Chandler (2009) finds that state affluence is a key factor in the development 
of Sustainable Energy Portfolios. To ensure that state innovation of GHG tracking and reduction 
policies is not hampered by lack of state resources,  I  use a measure based on a state’s Gross 
State Product per capita from the Bureau of Economic Analysis between 2001 and 2010, similar 
to the one developed in Matisoff (2008). 
Hypothesis #8: States with more carbon dioxide emissions are more likely to adopt climate 
change action plans, GHG inventories, and reduction goals.  
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 In studies of the adoption of energy efficiency and renewable promotion policies, 
Matisoff (2008) finds some evidence that states with a more carbon-based economy are less 
likely to adopt these initiatives. In a similar manner, states that emit more carbon dioxide may be 
less likely to adopt GHG track and reduction policies to protect carbon-intensive industries. A 
measure is built based on the Energy Information Administration’s estimates of carbon intensity 
by state. 
Hypothesis #9: States with more potential for renewable energy are more likely to adopt climate 
change action plans, GHG inventories, and reduction goals.  
 One major component of these GHG tracking and reduction policies is the promotion of 
alternative, less carbon intensive energy sources. Two major sources of renewable energy are 
wind and solar power. It would be expected that state officials would be more likely to adopt 
these policies if they saw it as a chance to promote these energy sources. There is past evidence 
that suggests this is the case. Lyon and Yin (2008) find that those states with large wind and 
solar potential are more likely to adopt renewable energy portfolios. As a result, states should be 
more likely to adopt these policies if there is higher potential for wind and solar power in a state.  
Results 
 
To explore the relationship between political and economic conditions and the adoption of these 
three GHG tracking and reduction policies, I use logistic regression with an Event History Analysis 
(EHA) structured dataset.  Since the dependent variable is temporal and dichotomous,  logit with EHA is 
appropriate.  
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Table 2: Determinants of the Adoption of GHG Inventory (Logistic Regression)  
DV: Adoption by state and year Full Model Reduced Model 1 Reduced Model 2 Reduced Model 3 
     
     
Neighbor Adoption -1.862* -1.093   
 (1.108) (0.968)   
Regional Adoption 1.178  0.591  
 (1.090)  (0.926)  
Ideology Distance -0.0457   -0.0324 
 (0.0685)   (0.0656) 
State Citizen Ideology 0.0706*** 0.0677*** 0.0617*** 0.0710*** 
 (0.0222) (0.0200) (0.0198) (0.0212) 
Party of Governor 0.343 0.290 0.241 0.310 
 (0.454) (0.435) (0.433) (0.446) 
Gross State Product 6.91e-06 5.23e-06 4.22e-06 6.09e-06 
 (6.60e-06) (5.93e-06) (5.76e-06) (6.57e-06) 
C02 Production 0.00628 0.00539 0.00436 0.00634 
 (0.00629) (0.00601) (0.00580) (0.00617) 
Coal Production 6.30e-08 -4.36e-08 -4.29e-08 5.00e-08 
 (2.21e-07) (2.09e-07) (2.11e-07) (2.18e-07) 
Natural Gas Production 3.39e-07 7.37e-07* 5.35e-07 3.68e-07 
 (5.08e-07) (4.42e-07) (4.38e-07) (4.78e-07) 
Wind Potential 5.53e-07** 5.29e-07** 4.88e-07** 4.95e-07** 
 (2.32e-07) (2.17e-07) (2.10e-07) (2.27e-07) 
Solar Potential 0.0652 0.0522 0.0530 0.0769 
 (0.0874) (0.0801) (0.0817) (0.0866) 
Population -4.59e-07 -3.42e-07 -2.88e-07 -4.42e-07 
 (4.65e-07) (4.19e-07) (4.13e-07) (4.70e-07) 
Year 0.300* 0.319** 0.179 0.233** 
 (0.155) (0.126) (0.123) (0.108) 
Constant -607.2* -647.2** -365.7 -474.4** 
 (310.6) (253.5) (247.1) (216.9) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1667 0.1791 0.1749 0.1507 
     
Proportional Reduction in Error 0.00% 6.67% 10.00% 0.00% 
Observations 326 376 376 326 
Logit coefficients in coefficient lines, Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Determinants of the Adoption of GHG Targets (Logistic Regression) 
DV: Adoption by state and year     
 Full Model Reduced Model 1 Reduced Model 2 Reduced Model 3 
     
Neighbor Adoption -0.410 -0.960   
 (1.290) (1.093)   
Regional Adoption 2.588*  -0.000356  
 (1.534)  (0.986)  
Ideology Distance -0.0544   -0.0479 
 (0.0374)   (0.0330) 
State Citizen Ideology 0.0811** 0.0719*** 0.0625*** 0.0848*** 
 (0.0358) (0.0245) (0.0224) (0.0320) 
Party of Governor 0.722 0.690 0.713 0.111 
 (1.183) (0.550) (0.566) (1.002) 
Gross State Product 1.60e-05 8.11e-06 7.56e-06 1.33e-05 
 (1.02e-05) (7.46e-06) (7.64e-06) (9.76e-06) 
C02 Production -0.0244* -0.0181* -0.0174* -0.0153 
 (0.0132) (0.0104) (0.0103) (0.0114) 
Coal Production 5.56e-08 -5.06e-07 -4.35e-07 -2.32e-07 
 (6.21e-07) (7.04e-07) (6.93e-07) (6.38e-07) 
Natural Gas Production 2.60e-07 8.47e-07 7.67e-07 2.50e-07 
 (7.04e-07) (5.97e-07) (5.92e-07) (6.44e-07) 
Wind Potential 5.12e-07 -2.08e-07 -1.78e-07 2.09e-07 
 (5.11e-07) (3.82e-07) (3.86e-07) (4.67e-07) 
Solar Potential 0.628** -0.0737 -0.0507 0.390* 
 (0.262) (0.105) (0.109) (0.204) 
Population -1.67e-06* 7.22e-08 4.43e-08 -1.16e-06 
 (8.70e-07) (4.49e-07) (4.56e-07) (7.54e-07) 
Year 0.103 0.132 0.0920 0.160 
 (0.182) (0.132) (0.123) (0.167) 
Constant -215.7 -272.5 -191.3 -330.1 
 (364.3) (265.2) (246.2) (335.7) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.3758 0.2889 0.2840 0.3537 
     
Proportional Reduction in Error -5.88% 5.00% 5.00% -5.88% 
Observations 352 402 402 352 
Logit coefficients in coefficient lines, Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Determinants of the Adoption of GHG Action Plans (Logistic Regression) 
     
DV: Adoption by state and year Full Model Reduced Model 1 Reduced Model 2 Reduced Model 3 
     
Neighbor Adoption 0.483 0.584   
 (1.092) (0.846)   
Regional Adoption 0.333  0.506  
 (1.221)  (0.929)  
Ideology Distance -0.0183   -0.0179 
 (0.0205)   (0.0201) 
State Citizen Ideology 0.0508**   0.0660*** 0.0631*** 0.0519** 
 (0.0244) (0.0189) (0.0190) (0.0239) 
Party of Governor 0.538 0.779* 0.861* 0.501 
 (0.756) (0.465) (0.487) (0.695) 
Gross State Product 3.43e-06 3.54e-06 4.25e-06 3.09e-06 
 (6.97e-06) (6.28e-06) (6.41e-06) (6.70e-06) 
C02 Production -0.00888 -0.00968 -0.00977 -0.00957 
 (0.00733) (0.00719) (0.00718) (0.00732) 
Coal Production -2.39e-07 -2.01e-07 -2.14e-07 -2.42e-07 
 (3.51e-07) (3.41e-07) (3.44e-07) (3.47e-07) 
Natural Gas Production -4.51e-08 3.13e-08 2.59e-08 1.41e-08 
 (4.34e-07) (4.27e-07) (4.31e-07) (4.26e-07) 
Wind Potential 2.43e-07 1.65e-07 1.69e-07 2.23e-07 
 (2.40e-07) (2.32e-07) (2.31e-07) (2.37e-07) 
Solar Potential 0.138 0.129 0.130 0.122 
 (0.0957) (0.0872) (0.0891) (0.0906) 
Population -2.78e-07 -2.67e-07 -2.97e-07 -2.23e-07 
 (4.95e-07) (4.46e-07) (4.58e-07) (4.75e-07) 
Year 0.255* 0.306** 0.301** 0.329*** 
 (0.152) (0.120) (0.135) (0.119) 
Constant -517.8* -621.1** -610.9** -665.0*** 
 (305.1) (241.4) (270.4) (239.7) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2283 0.2331 0.2323 0.2249 
     
Proportional Reduction in Error -3.45% -13.33% -13.33% -10.34% 
Observations 340 390 390 340 
Logit coefficients in coefficient lines, Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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As indicated by Table 2 through 4, external factors seem to play a limited role in the 
adoption of climate change policies. For the most part, there is no relationship between adoption 
of these policies and neighboring and regional adoption, along with the ideology of previous 
adopters. The only external factors to play a modest role are the regional adoption of climate 
reduction policies (Table 3, Full Model), and the neighborhood adoption of GHG inventories 
(Table 2). For climate reduction policies, states are more likely to adopt these policies if other 
regional states adopt as well. This makes sense concerning many Northeastern states participate 
in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, which includes caps on emissions. Previous 
discussion through this initiative could have provoked states to talk about how to coordinate their 
targets with other participants. Nevertheless, these results are quite weak and should be 
questioned. For the GHG inventory results, one should view these results with caution because it 
is the weakest model in Table 2 (pseudo-R squared of 0.1667). 
The strongest results come from internal state factors influencing the adoption of all three 
climate change policies. The strongest of these internal factors include state citizen ideology. 
Across all models, as states become more liberal, then they are more likely to adopt these 
policies. Economic factors through increase consumption of energy and gross state product are 
more important for states who adopt reduction goals.  There is some evidence that as renewable 
potential increases, then the more likely a state adopts GHG inventories and reduction policies. 
Additionally, across three models in Table 3 there is some, but weak, evidence that states that 
produce smaller carbon dioxide emissions are more likely to adopt GHG targets. Also, 
Democratic governor are more likely to adopt climate action clans (Table 4). However, the 
results for carbon dioxide emissions and party of governor are not consistent across models.  
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Citizen ideology is the strongest indicator across climate policy and statistical model of 
adoption. Univariate analysis indicates that that across these policies, states with more liberal 
populations are more likely to adopt these climate policies rather than others.  
Table 3: Average State Citizen 
Ideology at Policy Adoption year 
All 3 policies 63.22 
Plans and Inventories 55.00 
Only Inventory 45.57 
No policies 39.23 
 
   
    
As Table 3 indicates, citizen ideology separates adoption of all parts of a plan with no 
policies at all. The average ideology of states when adopting all policies is at 63.22 (out of 100), 
compared to the average ideology of states who don’t adopt the policies at 39.2295 (between 
2002 and 2011).  This indicates that more liberal states adopt more climate change policies. 
There are also ideological differences in each type of policies. The average ideology of states 
who adopt GHG inventories is 57.41, action plans are 61.19, and reduction targets are 66.00114.   
Discussion 
The evidence presented here is mostly consistent with previous research: internal state 
politics influence climate policy outcomes. However, the results here present a slightly different 
picture. Previous research suggests that government ideology impacts a state’s willingness to 
develop plans to address climate change. Yet, there is only a weak link between the adoption of 
these policies and the party of the sitting governor. This suggests that those who often are the 
initiators of these policies are responding to state government ideological pressures. This 
indicates that political actors mostly respond to political demands of climate change policies, 
despite their own political affiliation.  
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 Also, less liberal states are willing to adopt policies to gather data concerning the 
problem through carbon dioxide inventories. Only  more liberal states establish actual plans for 
action and set goals. This suggests that for the most part, rather than external ideological cues 
about the validity of a policy, states adopt and modify their policies to fit their own statutory and 
economic goals and political contexts. States may be willing to adopt policies to look at the 
problem of climate change, but that does not mean that they enact policies to actually mitigate 
the problem.  
Additionally, there are still some null or inconsistent findings concerning other external 
and internal state factors. Those states that have neighbors or regional adopters, ideological 
similar to previous adopters, have more financial resources, are no more or less likely to produce 
plans or goals for GHG reduction. This suggests that internal politics considerations matter the 
most when considering adoption. 
There is also inconsistent evidence that a state’s ability to develop climate change 
policies is contingent on the development of renewable resources or traditional energy sources. 
While states with high potential for wind energy development are more likely to develop GHG 
inventories and those with higher solar potential are more likely to adopt reduction plans. There 
is only limited evidence that states adopt these to boost renewable energy development. Also, 
only in some models is there evidence that states with less carbon dioxide emissions are more 
likely to adopt GHG targets, which suggests that states with less severe GHG problems are the 
ones likely to try to set goals to solve the problem.  
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Conclusion 
 
There are several theoretical, empirical, and policy implications from this chapter. First, 
consist with previous theoretical arguments about climate change policy. Internal factors play a 
larger role in the adoption of climate change policy. Internal politics (i.e. citizen ideology) 
mostly dominate considerations of the adoption of state climate change policies.  With some 
exceptions, external pressures play a minimal role. The lack of external pressure to adopt these 
policies since these policies can cover a large portion of a state’s economy and external cues 
about the validity of these expansive policies may be limited. Not only do states tailor their 
climate action plans to their own  specific economic needs, the initial decision to adopt these 
policies in the first place depend on the ideological make-up of the public. Other factors such as 
financial constraints, problem severity, and renewable energy play less of a factor.  
The empirical evidence also suggests that those states most likely to contribute to the 
problem of climate change are those states no or more less likely to adopt policies to solve the 
problem. Large producers of carbon dioxide emissions, like Texas and Louisiana, are more 
hesitant or refuse to address the problem on their own. The counter-example would be large 
states, like California and New York, also who adopted all three climate policies but are 
significant carbon producers.  
The evidence presented here, along with past research, suggests the limitations of states 
to properly mitigate the GHGs that affect the climate. Not only is the number of states who adopt 
these policies limited, states may run into climate governance problems with the limited amount 
of financial resources and partial implementation of these tracking and reduction policies. One 
common criticism climate action plans, is that while states develop plans for action, often these 
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policies lack the monetary backing necessary to properly achieve intended goals (Wheeler 2008). 
Additionally, Pollak et al. (2011) indicate that the non-binding nature of climate actions plans 
affects whether actual policy implementation mirrors the initial recommendations. They note that 
major shifts with economic and political environment can change the viability of the adoption of 
these policies. All of which may hamper states to govern on their own.  
There are several limitations in this study that must be built upon into the future. New 
research indicates that the strictness of a policy may also influence where or not a policy is 
adopted (Carley and Miller 2012). Further research could further analyze the details of each 
climate action through an institutional grammar tool developed by Sue Crawford and Elinor 
Ostrom (1995). This tool could further analyze components of climate action plans to indicate 
plan strengths and weaknesses. This could provide further into why certain language is adopted 
for these types of policies by state. This could allow for further development of a strength of 
adoption variable which would explore beyond the dichotomous nature of these policies 
presented in this study.  
The analysis presented here shows potential warning signs for cooperation between the 
federal and state governments in the future over mitigation issues. If states are reluctant to 
voluntarily adopt policies to address the problem of climate change, this indicates a possible 
contentious environment for the EPA’s mandate for states reach certain carbon dioxide emission 
goals. The political reality of clean air politics in some states may come into direct conflict with 
these ambitious goals into the future. However, what is certain is that on their own, state climate 
policy adoption is not enough to address the magnitude of this global issue.  
 
 
28 
 
References 
 
(2014). "Climate Change Action Plans." Retrieved 3/11, 2014, from 
http://epa.gov/statelocalclimate/state/state-examples/action-plans.html. 
(2014). "Greenhouse Gas Inventories." Retrieved 3/14, 2014, from 
http://epa.gov/statelocalclimate/state/state-examples/ghg-inventory.html#all. 
Barrilleaux, C. J. and M. E. Miller (1988). "The political economy of state Medicaid policy." The 
American Political Science Review: 1089-1107. 
Bassett, E. and V. Shandas (2010). "Innovation and climate action planning: Perspectives from 
municipal plans." Journal of the American Planning Association 76(4): 435-450. 
Berry, F. S. and W. D. Berry (1990). "State lottery adoptions as policy innovations: An event history 
analysis." The American Political Science Review: 395-415. 
Berry, F. S. and W. D. Berry (1992). "Tax innovation in the states: Capitalizing on political 
opportunity." American Journal of Political Science: 715-742. 
Berry, W. D. (2011). A New Measure of State Government Ideology, and New Evidence that an Old 
Measure Performs Well, Indiana State University. 
Boswell, M. R., et al. (2010). "An assessment of the link between greenhouse gas emissions inventories 
and climate action plans." Journal of the American Planning Association 76(4): 451-462. 
Carley, S. and T. R. Browne (2012). "Innovative US energy policy: a review of states’ policy 
experiences." Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Energy and Environment. 
29 
 
Chandler, J. (2009). "Trendy solutions: why do states adopt sustainable energy portfolio standards?" 
Energy Policy 37(8): 3274-3281. 
Coley, J. S. and D. J. Hess (2012). "Green energy laws and Republican legislators in the United States." 
Energy Policy 48: 576-583. 
Crawford, S. E. and E. Ostrom (1995). "A grammar of institutions." American Political Science Review 
89(03): 582-600. 
Drummond, W. J. (2010). "Statehouse Versus Greenhouse: Have State-Level Climate Action Planners 
and Policy Entrepreneurs Reduced Greenhouse Gas Emissions?" Journal of the American 
Planning Association 76(4): 413-433. 
Fowler, L. and J. Breen (2013). "The Impact of Political Factors on States’ Adoption of Renewable 
Portfolio Standards." The Electricity Journal. 
Haider-Markel, D. P. (2001). "Policy diffusion as a geographical expansion of the scope of political 
conflict: Same-sex marriage bans in the 1990s." State Politics & Policy Quarterly 1(1): 5-26. 
Hays, S. P. and H. R. Glick (1997). "The role of agenda setting in policy innovation." American Politics 
Research 25(4): 497-516. 
Kontokosta, C. E. (2011). "Greening the regulatory landscape: the spatial and temporal diffusion of 
green building policies in US cities." The Journal of Sustainable Real Estate 3(1): 68-90. 
Krause, R. M. (2011). "Policy innovation, intergovernmental relations, and the adoption of climate 
protection initiatives by US cities." Journal of Urban Affairs 33(1): 45-60. 
30 
 
Krause, R. M. (2011). "Symbolic or substantive policy? Measuring the extent of local commitment to 
climate protection." Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 29(1): 46-62. 
Lester, J. P. (1980). "Partisanship and Environmental Policy The Mediating Influence of State 
Organizational Structures." Environment and Behavior 12(1): 101-131. 
Matisoff, D. C. (2008). "The Adoption of State Climate Change Policies and Renewable Portfolio 
Standards: Regional Diffusion or Internal Determinants?" Review of Policy Research 25(6): 527-
546. 
Pollak, M., et al. (2011). "Reducing greenhouse gas emissions: Lessons from state climate action plans." 
Energy Policy 39(9): 5429-5439. 
Rabe, B. G. (2008). "States on steroids: the intergovernmental odyssey of American climate policy." 
Review of Policy Research 25(2): 105-128. 
Stoutenborough, J. W. and M. Beverlin (2008). "Encouraging Pollution‐Free Energy: The Diffusion of 
State Net Metering Policies*." Social Science Quarterly 89(5): 1230-1251. 
Tang, Z., et al. (2011). "Examining locally driven climate change policy efforts in three Pacific states." 
Ocean & Coastal Management 54(5): 415-426. 
Tang, Z., et al. (2010). "Moving from agenda to action: evaluating local climate change action plans." 
Journal of environmental planning and management 53(1): 41-62. 
Urpelainen, J. (2009). "Explaining the Schwarzenegger phenomenon: local frontrunners in climate 
policy." Global Environmental Politics 9(3): 82-105. 
31 
 
Wheeler, S. M. (2008). "State and municipal climate change plans: the first generation." Journal of the 
American Planning Association 74(4): 481-496. 
Yi, H. (2012). "Policy Networks, Environmental Impacts And Economic Consequences Of Clean 
Energy In The Us: A National, State And Local Investigation." 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
Appendices 
 
Variable List  
 Name Description  
State Climate Action Plans 0= Not Adopt, 1=Adopt. 
http://epa.gov/statelocalclimate/state/state-
examples/action-plans.html#all 
State Greenhouse Gas Inventories 0= Not Adopt, 1=Adopt. 
http://epa.gov/statelocalclimate/state/state-examples/ghg-
inventory.html#all 
State Reduction Goals 0= Not Adopt, 1=Adopt. 
http://www.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/state/tracking/targets-
caps.html#a03 
Neighboring Adoption  Whether or not a state’s neighbor has adopted  a relevant 
policy (EPA).  
Regional Adoption Whether or not a state in an adopter’s EPA region has 
adopted a relevant policy  
Ideological Distance Distance of state from previous climate change policy 
adopters.  
Citizen Ideology  0-100 scale. 0= Very Conservative. 100= Very Liberal. Adapted 
from Berry et al. (2007). Years 2001-2011 are 2006 repeated. 
Berry et al. 2007. 
Governor Party of governor. 0=Republican, 1= Democratic. 
GSP Gross State Product per capita 
2002-2011. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
C02 CO2 Emissions from Fossil Fuel Combustion - Million 
Metric Tons CO2. * Emission estimates are based on 
energy consumption data from EIA's State Energy 
Consumption, Price, and Expenditure Estimates (SEDS). 
2002-2011. 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/states/_seds.html). 
Fossil Fuel Production Coal Production and Natural gas marketed production. 
Billion Btu.  from EIA's State Energy Consumption, Price, 
and Expenditure Estimates (SEDS) . 2002-2011. 
 
Solar Potential  National Renewable Energy Laboratory. Total Roof top PV 
Giga Watts per state.  
http://www.nrel.gov/gis/re_potential.html.  
Wind Potential  State Wind Potential Annual Generation. Terawatt-hours 
(TWh). http://www.pnas.org/content/106/27/10933.full.pdf 
Population Raw population numbers by state.  
Year Year of each case 
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Chapter 2: Siting of New Coal-based Power 
Responding to Clean Air Federalism: The Impact of a State’s Regulatory Environment on 
the Siting of New Coal-based Power 
In March 2012, the Obama administration proposed the first national limits on 
greenhouse gases from new power plants/stations. This decision met great resistance from some 
Republicans who argued that increasing costs on power plants would ultimately lead to blackouts 
and an upsurge in electricity rates. Conversely, many within the environmental movement 
believed this decision did not go far enough in combatting climate change, arguing that the 
decision only applied to new power plants and gave old coal-fired power plants years to comply 
with these standards (Associated Press 2012). Observers in the media suggested that the rule 
would have market implications and significantly limit the construction of new coal power plants 
until 2020 (Daily 2012).  
Despite forecasts of the decline and the negative properties of new coal-fired power 
plants, coal remains the dominant resource in the U.S. energy market for both production and 
consumption. In 2010, forty-three percent of all electricity came from coal. Coal continues to be 
a vital, portable, and non-renewable resource for U.S. electricity production. The U.S. coal 
industry produces the second most coal in the world (only behind China) with over a billion tons 
extracted each year (EIA 2011).  While coal is important economically-coal power plants 
produce fifty-nine percent of the nation’s sulfur dioxide, eighteen percent of nitrogen oxide, fifty 
percent of particle pollution, forty percent of carbon dioxide, and contribute significant amounts 
of mercury and hazardous toxins into the environment (Sueyoshi and Ueno 2010). Most 
scientists agree that the pollutant emissions from coal-fired power plants are a significant 
contributor to anthropogenic climate change and negatively affect the health and environment. 
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Over time, federal and state governments developed policies to address both the over reliance on 
and negative health implications of coal. 
Overall, the federal government has a mixed record on combatting air pollution. Many 
attribute the reduction of CAA air pollutants and improving the efficiency of coal powered plants 
to the Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1963 (Sueyoshi and Goto 2012).  However, the U.S. Congress 
failed to address the problem of escalating Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions—considered the 
root problem of anthropogenic climate change. The U.S. failed to ratify the Kyoto Treaty in 1998 
and to implement “cap and trade” legislation in 2009 (Rabe 2004).  While the federal 
government was successful in reducing some air pollutants, they were unable to reduce GHG 
emissions. Consequently states responded by making their own commitments to combat this 
problem through the development of climate change policies.   
With the rise of state policy development on climate change, scholars began to study state 
climate change policy, but they under-address the regulatory regime’s impact on traditional 
energy sources. Scholarship expanded to climate change related issues such as the development 
of state alternative energy policy (e.g. Byrne et al. 2007; Mazmanian 2008; Menz and Vachon 
2006; Stoutenborough and Beverlin 2008; Weiner and Koontz 2010; Matisoff 2008), state 
reduction of greenhouse gases (e.g. Keeler 2007; Lutsey and Sperling 2008; Rabe 2004), and 
similarly, a robust collection of literature explains what state characteristics influence the 
adoption of more pro-environmental legislation (e.g. Bacot and Dawes 1997; Lester 1995; 
Matisoff 2008; Ringquist 1993; Potoski and Woods 2001; Koontz, 2002). However, only a few 
scholars directly consider how policy influences the use of traditional sources of energy (e.g. 
Peterson and Rose 2006; Horiuchi 2007; Hedge and Scicchitano 1994; Ringquist 1993), and 
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examine the impact of CAA regulations on coal-fired power plant environmental and economic 
efficiency across states (Sueyoshi and Goto 2010; Sueyoshi et al. 2009; Fleishman et al. 2009).   
Surprisingly, there remains a gap in the policy literature explaining how regulation 
affects the siting coal power plants.
8
  States can place caps on carbon emissions, develop policies 
to encourage renewable energy, and make state air quality standards more stringent than national 
standards. Yet unexpectedly, the response of owners of power plants to this uneven regulatory 
context remains mostly a mystery. Did these state air regulations influence the siting of new 
coal-fired power by owners? More specifically, do strict, environmentally-friendly air quality 
standards under the CAA and the state regulatory context prevent the development of coal power 
in a state?  
The case of coal-based power presents an opportunity in which to explore and address the 
“Race-to-the Bottom” (RTTB) hypothesis and clarify some of the past methodological problems. 
Since coal-based power is a high polluting industry and subject to many environmental 
regulations, the RTTB framework provides a lens to analyze private-enterprise decision-making. 
Policy scholars have found mixed evidence when they examined whether state governments 
reduce environment regulations or compliance in response to interstate economic competition as 
RTTB would suggest (Millimet 2003; Konisky 2009; Potoski 2001; Woods 2006; Konisky 
2008). Economists have found unclear evidence about whether businesses respond by siting in 
states with less-stringent environmental standards (Levinson 1996; Fleishman et al. 2009). 
However, with new data on the permitting process for power plants and a better methodological 
                                                          
8
 A variety of public and private entities own and operate power generation facilities.  From now on the term 
“owner” will refer to a mixture of these organizations.  
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approach of looking at business behavior at the beginning of the regulatory process, rather than 
the end, clarifies the consistencies with past research on this hypothesis.  
 Through the analysis of applications for air quality permits under the New Source 
Review (NSR) process, this study explains the variation of industry’s behavior in response to 
diverse state air quality standards under the CAA. I review the history and detail of regulatory 
standards for new sources of pollution set by the CAA and I investigate how policy scholars 
evaluated energy policy on the national and subnational level. I then outline my expectations for 
how industry and states have likely responded to environmental regulations through the lens of 
the “Race-to-the-Bottom” effect. Through my statistical analysis, I highlight empirical evidence 
that suggests that the strictness of air quality regulations and the ideology of a state’s citizenry 
guide the behavior of owners in the number of applications and size of proposed coal power 
during the permitting process.  The evidence indicates that coal plant siting is a case in which 
certain kinds of states limit the effectiveness environmental standards.  
Literature Review 
 
Environmental Federalism and the Clean Air Act  
 
Since the late 1970s and 1980s, the United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) devolved certain powers to state environmental agencies, and as a result, these 
subnational agencies were given more autonomy in the implementation and decision-making 
process of traditionally federally governed environmental programs. The Environmental Council 
of the States (ECOS) estimates that by 1998, the EPA gave states authority over 757 federal 
environmental programs, up from 434 in 1993, which also included eighty-two percent of all 
programs related to the Clean Air Act (Vig and Kraft 2003). By 2004, states issued ninety 
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percent of all environmental permits, and three-fourths of all enforcement of environmental laws 
(Rabe 2004). The rise of the states in environmental policy-making also translated a rise in their 
authority over air quality.  
Similarly, most of the air quality regulations in the United States originate from the CAA, 
but each state developed their own air quality regulations based on minimum requirements 
developed by the EPA. In this cooperative relationship, the EPA sets minimum standards for 
state air quality, ambient air standards, and the issuing of permits, as well as overlooks and 
approves state monitoring and enforcement programs. Through State Implementation plans 
(SIP), states define how they meet federal standards. If the EPA determines the SIP did not meet 
federal guidelines, then the EPA can “pre-empt” the state clear air programs and implement all or 
part of the program. Most states have their SIPs approved, and most programs met or exceed the 
EPA standards (Potoski 2001; Konisky and Wood 2010). This cooperation between the two set a 
minimum regulatory standard, but allowed for a great deal of regulatory variation across states.  
In coordination with each other, both the federal government and states develop air 
quality programs, which consist of air quality standards, new source pollution standards, and 
monitoring systems.  The EPA developed the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) 
for sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, carbon monoxide, ozone, nitrogen dioxide, and lead. These 
EPA standards dictated how much of each pollutant can been released into the air without posing 
a significant risk to the public’s health (Potoski 2001).  Based on those NAAQ standards, the 
state government then developed ambient air quality standards, which determines the standards 
for the allowable increases of pollution in an area (EPA 2012). With new sources of pollution, 
states developed New Source Performance Standards (NSPS). These standards govern new 
sources of emissions and their allowable concentration. Sources under NSPS are required to 
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demonstrate initial performance tests to determine compliance (EPA 2012). To monitor 
industry’s compliance, the states are required to develop an ambient monitoring standard to 
measure both the type and quantity of air contaminates (EPA 2012). The EPA mandates that 
states implement an air-monitoring program with a certain number of monitoring stations. States 
can choose whether to increase the number of monitoring stations in their program (Potoski 
2001). 
Companies go through an application process through state environmental agencies to 
build a new source/ expand upon existing coal power and provide information for different 
permits to meet these regulatory standards. One important stage for the permitting process is the 
pre-construction phase where new major sources of pollutants are subjected to the New Source 
Review (NSR). This review process consists of two rules: Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New Source Review (NSR). Power plants are subjected 
to these either/both these rules based location of the new source. The main difference is 
nonattainment NSR applies to nonattainment pollutants whereas PSD applies to attainment 
pollutants.
9
 The EPA or a delegated state or local agency a state under an approved SIP issue 
PSD and NSR permits. Most states have their own SIP, and therefore state regulators issue 
permits. 
While the federal government develops minimum standards for this application process, 
the stringency of state air quality regulatory process depends on the characteristics of the state. 
Potoski (2001) indicates that states with larger environmental groups, public support for 
environmental protection, and legislative professionalism are more likely to have more strict 
ambient air standards, while only environmental groups influence emission standards and 
                                                          
9 For more information concerning the differences between the two rules see http://www.epa.state.il.us/air/new-source-
review/new-source-review-part-1.html.  
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ambient monitoring.  Therefore, variations of regulations exist for coal-fired power plants 
depending on the state.  
Scholars are unclear as to whether more stringent air quality programs under the CAA 
negative impact the economics underlying the operation of a coal-fired power plant. Some 
scholars are more optimistic about influence of the CAA regulations on coal-fired power plant 
efficiency (Sueyoshi and Goto 2012), while others find the mixed results of regulations on an 
operator of a power plant to keep plant costs down while reducing air pollution and increasing 
electricity generation (Fleishman et al 2009). Some scholars suggest a link between the power of 
the regulated industry and oversight. Hedge and Scicchitano (1994) find that size of the relevant 
industry within a state can influence the Clean Air Act’s regulatory oversight by federal officials. 
However, this is only a measure of the effect of the industry’s power on oversight, rather than 
written standards.  
Consequently, the literature provides unclear evidence concerning the influence of air 
quality regulation on owners of coal-fired power plants.  It suggests that air quality regulations at 
the state level may incur significant costs that operators may want to avoid through the siting of 
expansion of coal power. However, it is unclear if these costs affect the profits of power plant 
owners when the federal government heavily subsidizes the fossil fuel industry (Morales 2010).  
Each state’s environmental regulatory agency, legislature, and public utility commission 
(PUC) have diverse powers to influence coal-based electricity. State environmental agencies 
regulate air emissions, utility cost recovery, power plant siting, and utility power portfolios, as 
well as issue new source operating and air quality permits. State legislatures can modify state 
statute to influence many of these regulatory powers. PUCs can influence the state’s electricity 
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supplier whose responsibility is to provide low-cost, safe, reliable, and adequate power to 
consumers and accomplish other policy demands (Cowart et al. 2008).  This suggests that the 
variation of a state’s regulatory environment influences its own energy market.  
“Race to the bottom” (RTTB) Effect 
 
Economists and policy scholars disagree over whether the regulatory costs imposed on 
industry creates a RTTB effect. Some scholars contend that government officials lower 
environmental regulations in order to decrease costs on existing and future businesses to compete 
with other states in attempt to lure industry to the state. Industry will cite in states with less 
stringent regulatory environments to decrease costs.  
Public policy scholars find mixed results in their response to interstate economic 
competition in enforcement and regulatory actions. State environmental regulators are concerned 
about the impressions air regulation standards give to industry and about the effect regulations 
and practices--such as the flexibility of state officials to work with officials, the timing/expense 
of permits, the stringency of written standards, pollution control incentives, and the stringency of 
written enforcement have on siting decision-making (Konisky 2007) . In the case of surface 
mining enforcement, Woods (2006) finds that state competition influence state official’s 
enforcement if neighboring state enforcement levels are lower than their own.  However, 
Konisky (2009) finds little evidences that officials in states more susceptible to interstate 
economic competition are more likely to change their regulatory enforcement behavior in 
response to other state’s regulatory behavior. Also, there is no evidence that states race to the 
bottom on CAA air quality standards. In fact, Potoski (2001) finds that states develop standards 
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more stringent than set national CAA standards and states that are more economically reliant on 
polluting industries are not more or less likely to exceed standards than those that are not.   
The siting of coal-fired power presents a unique opportunity to study a gap in the 
economics of the RTTB phenomenon. Economists investigate the siting of an assortment of 
industries such as hazardous waste sites (Levinson 1999), textiles, electronics, chemicals, and the 
production of petroleum/coal (Levinson 1996), as well as other industries (Bartike 1988; 
Brunnermeier 2004) in jurisdictions with more stringent tax and environmental regulations. 
While this literature covers industrial products, it does not cover production of electricity. 
Generation of coal-based power shares the following similar characteristics to previously 
examined industries: high levels of pollution subject to state air regulations, movable resources 
for production of a commodity, potential for local economic growth and the export of a 
product(s).  It is also unique because of the immobile nature of existing facilities to produce 
electricity (Potoski 2001), since other facilities, such as factories, are more mobile. The 
transmission of electricity occurs over long distances and is not constrained by state boundaries, 
and provides a unique situation in which to understand the race to the bottom phenomena.  
Conceptually, firms may be especially sensitive to regulatory environments if the mobility of 
facilities is limited.  
Traditionally, economists and public policy scholars studying the RTTB effect on 
industry behavior ignore the permitting process. Normal indications of an industry’s response to 
environmental regulations include plant births, inbound and outbound foreign direct investments, 
and net exports (Brunnermeier 2004).  Through surveys of actors within industry scholars 
indicate marginal to no evidence that environmental regulations play a major part in location 
decisions (Davis 1992; Epping 1986). However, this scholarship ignores the initial point in 
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which industry interacts with regulators via the permitting process.  The permitting process for 
electricity generation is ripe for investigation and may yield important results because heavy-
polluting industries require approval for a variety of permits for the siting of new facilities.  
State Energy Policy  
The state energy and climate change policy literature explains a lot of the reasons behind 
the adoption of alternative energy policies, but much is unknown about state policy toward 
traditional forms of energy such as coal. Scholars explain much about what influences the 
development of state alternative energy policy (Byrne et al. 2007; Mazmanian 2008; Menz and 
Vachon 2006; Stoutenborough and Beverlin 2008; Weiner and Koontz 2010; Matisoff 2008), 
state reduction of greenhouse gases (Keeler 2007; Lutsey and Sperling 2008; Rabe 2004), and  
the effect of state characteristics’ influence on the adoption of more pro-environmental 
legislation (Bacot and Dawes 1997; Lester 1995; Matisoff 2008; Ringquist 1993; Potoski and 
Woods 2001; Koontz 2002). Despite a focus on newer “green” forms of energy, the literature is 
less robust concerning traditional, more widely utilized sources of electricity (e.g. coal, natural 
gas, and oil). Only a few scholars take into consideration the impact of climate change and 
energy policy on fossil fuels. Some explore the impact of renewable energy policy on fossil fuel 
consumption and the interaction between state climate change policy and energy policy (see: 
Peterson and Rose 2006; Horiuchi 2007).  While other scholars have examined the impact of 
Clean Air Act regulations on coal-fired power plant environmental and economic efficiency 
across states (Sueyoshi and Goto 2010; Sueyoshi et al. 2009; Fleishman et al. 2009), the level of 
analysis has been on individual plant outputs in response to regulation. 
Methods 
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Overview and Dependent Variables  
 
I analyze submissions of application for permits to state environmental agencies between 
1999 and 2009 under the New Source Review (NSR) process. Specifically, it measures the 
number of applications and the size of the proposed new coal-fired power in that application. To 
be clear: this study is not concerned with the ultimate result of the permitting process. It focuses 
only on the initial interest by owners by formally applying for permission for air quality permits 
for new coal power projects by state and year.  
The dependent variables are based on the number and size of new coal-fired power 
applications for air quality permits. The national coal project dataset provides information on the 
state, year of first draft of these applications, size of added capacity, and other useful information 
on the application process for new coal power. This study uses applications with dates and the 
number of added megawatt power. Conceptual projects, incomplete applications and pre-
applications for construction are also not included. However, this study does include applications 
that were submitted but later withdrawn. In most cases, if a permit does not have an application 
date it is only conceptual and or speculation on an application. 
While many of the variables in this study shift temporally, some of these measures are 
time invariant due to the availability of data (only air regulation variables and rail mileage are 
time invariant). This study utilizes negative binomial statistical analysis of the number of 
applications by state and year. Negative binomial is a count model that takes into account over-
dispersion of dependent variables. Tests indicate an over dispersion of the number of 
applications submitted per year. Statisticians argue that models with dependent variables over a 
dispersion above 1 should utilize a negative binomial model instead of Poisson. For the size 
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dependent variable, the natural log (due to the abnormal distribution of the data) of the size of the 
proposed coal power expansion by year and state is analyzed using Ordinary Least Squares.
10
  
Independent Variables and Hypotheses 
 
This study investigates four independent variables that measure relation to strictness of 
regulations and state citizen ideology.
 11
 These include Air Quality Standards (AAQS), New 
Source Performance Standards (NSPS), and Ambient Monitoring. The New Source Review 
utilizes these standards when analyzing permit applications. This study measures these variables 
similarly to the 1998 State Air Pollution Control Survey (SAPCS) presented in Potoski (2001).
12
 
Hypothesis 1a: States with stricter AAQS receive fewer applications for new sources of 
coal power per year.  
Hypothesis 1b: States with stricter AAQS receive coal power applications with smaller 
electricity capacity per year.  
Hypothesis 2a:  States with stricter New Source Performance Standards receive fewer 
applications for new sources of coal power per year. 
Hypothesis 2b: States with stricter New Source Performance Standards receive coal 
power proposals with smaller electricity capacity per year. 
Hypothesis 3a: States with stricter Ambient monitoring standards receive fewer 
applications for a new source of coal power per year.  
Hypothesis 3b: States with stricter Ambient monitoring standards receive coal power 
applications with smaller electricity capacity per year. 
 Consistent with the RTTB phenomenon, these hypotheses assert that future coal 
development in a state is a result of fewer costs imposed by CAA regulations.  The concentration 
of major pollutants that affect the health of the public and environment set by AAQS, NSPS, and 
ambient monitoring reflect a commitment to protecting the health of the public and the 
                                                          
10
 This significantly limits the number of applications analyzed to around sixty (all zero values are dropped). 
11
 For a quick look at all variables, consult the Variable Table in the Appendices.  
12
 For more information please reference Potoski (2001) or the SAPCS 1998 survey. Unfortunately this survey has 
not been updated since 1998.  
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environment from criteria pollutants, and therefore deter future development of coal based power 
in a state. Despite this argument, these regulations may only matter after the fact. Since the EPA 
or state agency performs air quality analysis and determines if the proposal violates any rules, 
companies may leave it to the state agency to determine the proposal’s viability, rather than 
spending time doing it themselves.  
 New Source standards directly apply to new coal power and the extra costs imposed on 
companies to clean up emissions can be unattractive for companies and will be less likely to 
invest in both size and number of coal power due to costs. Some scholars indicate that CAA 
regulations improve plant efficiency, and therefore may be less concerned about these regulatory 
impacts on costs (Sueyoshi and Goto 2012). Companies may recognize this as positive 
development and be less concerned with the price of regulations. Yet, others indicate that costs 
of regulations influence decision-making when complying with CAA regulations (Fleishman et 
al 2009).  
 Similar to AAQS, ambient monitoring should also determine an overall commitment of a 
state to minimize the impact of emissions from major sources of pollution and protect the 
environment—specifically to monitor that commitment. Therefore, companies may avoid not 
only states that signal a standard set for overall air pollution, but also indicate their willingness to 
monitor and enforce other relevant regulations.  
Hypothesis 4a:  States with more liberal citizens receive fewer applications for new sources of 
coal power.  
Hypothesis 4b:   States with more liberal citizens receive new coal power applications with 
smaller electricity capacity per year. 
This study also evaluates a state’s ideological influence on firm decision-making as a 
proxy for evidence of the RTTB phenomenon. The political context, as measured by citizen 
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ideology and party control of the legislature, reflects a state’s commitment to pro-environmental 
policy (Matisoff 2008; Ringquist 1993; Potoski 2001). The political makeup of a state 
government influences regulation and can promote alternative forms of energy. Yin and Powers 
(2010) find that Renewable Portfolio Standards do promote renewable energy within a state, and 
states with more Democratic legislatures are more likely to adopt RPS policies (Lyon and Yin 
2008). Consequently, owners could worry about the potential for new pro-environmental state air 
regulations in more liberal states, and alternative energy promotion may affect an owner’s 
decision not to further develop coal-generated electricity. Additionally, these new or existing air 
quality regulations may ultimately impact these firms’ bottom line.  
 In addition, a state’s political climate should also influence the reaction of owners of 
these facilities to regulatory oversight. Hedge and Scicchitano (1994) indicate in a study of the 
Office of Surface Mining that a state’s political environment or commitment to regulation 
influences the flexibility of federal regulators in their oversight of industry. States with a more 
liberal population or government should be more committed to enforcing regulations, and 
oversight by federal regulations should be stricter. Therefore, utilities should apply in 
conservative states, where oversight is more flexible.  
Control variables 
 I employ a number of state economic variables to account for the economic effects of the 
siting of new coal fired power. Previous literature indicates important measures to compare state 
energy policy and their commitment to climate change (Peterson and Rose 2006). Peterson and 
Rose 2006 use a variety of state demographic/ economic indicators, such as state population, 
GSP (per capita Gross State Product), GSP from manufacturing, to compare energy policy across 
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states. State population is important in understanding the increase in demand for electricity, but 
also concerns for the distribution of costs on the population for combatting climate change, 
which Peterson and Rose (2006) indicate is an issue with the development of state energy policy.  
Furthermore, state commitment to the production and consumption of coal indicates a 
previous reliance on a certain amount of greenhouse gases in a state’s energy policy (Peterson 
and Rose 2006). If a state produces more coal, then they are likely to develop it in the future 
and/or less likely to develop climate change policy. The production of coal may also be 
important to the development of new coal power because of the availability of the resource and 
cheap transportation costs.  
I also control for the ability for owners to access coal for production of electricity. 
Previously, scholars found a relationship between a state’s infrastructure and new industrial 
development (Levinson 1996; Brunnermeier and Levinson 2004). While most of this literature 
utilizes the measure of highways, I use total state railway mileage to capture the influence of 
infrastructure. The transportation of coal to power plants is an important element of the 
production of electricity because almost half of the commodities carried by the U.S. freight 
railroad industry are coal (AAR 2011). States with more railway infrastructure should be more 
appealing for the new construction/expansion of a coal power. 
Electricity prices are also important in the development in new coal power. Studies of 
policy development indicate that the price of electricity in states may promote alternative energy 
because of price volatility (Byrne et al. 2007). Yet others suggest that the price of electricity is of 
low priority in the reasons for wind energy development (Wiener and Koontz 2010).  While 
these are state policy studies, this should be applicable to industry decisions because public 
48 
 
utility commissions regulate utility companies’ rates to keep their prices affordable (Cowart et al. 
2008), and companies may develop new energy sources to fulfill this task.  
Finally, siting of facilities could be based upon past trends of behavior. Levinson (1996) 
argues that measures of existing manufacturing could indicate unobserved factors that make a 
state more attractive to industry. This measure of existing coal power also ensures to separate 
conditions for past economic behavior that lead to the construction of those plants, compared to 
the conditions measured by the other variables. 
 
Results/ Discussion 
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 Table 5: Factors that influence siting of increased coal megawatt capacity (based on permit 
applications) 
        
DV: Increase in 
Megawatt Capacity in a 
State/Year 
Full Model Reduced 
Model 1 
Reduced 
Model 2 
Reduced 
Model 3 
Reduced Model 
4 
Reduced 
Model 5 
Reduced Model 
6 
        
Ambient Air Quality -0.134  -0.102 -0.135* -0.135   
 (0.0954)  (0.0781) (0.0757) (0.0943)   
New Source Pollution -0.491  -0.858* -0.654 -0.464   
 (0.585)  (0.474) (0.460) (0.575)   
Ambient Monitoring 0.243  0.206 0.170 0.230   
 (0.328)  (0.244) (0.233) (0.323)   
Gross State Product -3.38e-06 -5.18e-07   -2.53e-06 -1.28e-06  
 (4.08e-06) (2.68e-06)   (3.55e-06) (2.44e-06)  
Population 7.58e-08 -1.11e-08 3.66e-08* 4.28e-08** 4.98e-08 1.71e-08 3.92e-08** 
 (1.54e-07) (1.13e-07) (1.96e-08) (1.89e-08) (1.40e-07) (1.06e-07) (1.59e-08) 
Coal Production -7.92e-07 -1.21e-06   -1.02e-06 -8.43e-07  
 (3.22e-06) (2.16e-06)   (3.14e-06) (2.09e-06)  
Electricity Price 0.0449 0.0299   0.0414 0.0263  
 (0.0570) (0.0422)   (0.0558) (0.0417)  
Citizen Ideology -0.0257 -0.0293**  -0.0319** -0.0290* -0.0265** -0.0244*** 
 (0.0173) (0.0112)  (0.0139) (0.0155) (0.0105) (0.00906) 
Railway 2.57e-05 0.000138   3.04e-05 0.000133  
 (0.000139) (8.37e-05)   (0.000137) (8.31e-05)  
Existing Coal Power -0.00452 0.00494 0.00154 0.00477   0.00572 
 (0.0104) (0.00699) (0.00791) (0.00767)   (0.00506) 
Manufacturing GSP 1.80e-05 5.48e-06   1.52e-05 7.88e-06  
 (1.41e-05) (9.15e-06)   (1.24e-05) (8.47e-06)  
Constant 7.525*** 6.622*** 7.348*** 8.822*** 7.653*** 6.661*** 7.209*** 
 (1.473) (0.834) (0.609) (0.868) (1.427) (0.829) (0.440) 
        
Observations 47 75 47 47 47 75 78 
R-squared 0.340 0.229 0.181 0.276 0.336 0.223 0.152 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Factors that influence siting of number of coal power projects (based on number 
permit applications) 
        
DV: Number of Permit 
Application in a State/Year 
Full Model Reduced 
Model 1 
Reduced 
Model 2 
Reduced 
Model 3 
Reduced 
Model 4 
Reduced 
Model 5 
Reduced 
Model 6 
        
Ambient Air Quality 0.0781  0.0710 0.0569 0.108   
 (0.0767)  (0.0764) (0.0761) (0.0760)   
New Source Pollution -0.942*  -0.862* -0.838* -1.309**   
 (0.570)  (0.507) (0.495) (0.549)   
Ambient Monitoring 0.143  0.334 0.305 0.0784   
 (0.230)  (0.227) (0.227) (0.224)   
Gross State Product 4.81e-06 5.84e-06**   4.51e-06* 2.76e-06  
 (2.95e-06) (2.50e-06)   (2.56e-06) (2.33e-06)  
Population -1.75e-07 -1.78e-07* 7.02e-
08*** 
7.49e-08*** -1.54e-07 -7.56e-08 5.54e-
08*** 
 (1.16e-07) (1.01e-07) (1.89e-08) (1.91e-08) (1.09e-07) (9.78e-08) (1.57e-08) 
Coal Production 1.08e-06 3.85e-08   1.96e-06 1.30e-06  
 (2.72e-06) (1.89e-06)   (2.68e-06) (1.78e-06)  
Electricity Price 0.0184 -0.0296   -0.00754 -0.0533  
 (0.0395) (0.0366)   (0.0316) (0.0334)  
Citizen Ideology -0.0214 -0.0263**  -0.0219* -0.0123 -0.0137 -
0.0290*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0113)  (0.0129) (0.0136) (0.0104) (0.00898) 
Railway 0.000283*** 0.000300***   0.000291*** 0.000337***  
 (0.000108) (8.43e-05)   (0.000107) (8.45e-05)  
Existing Coal Power 0.0137 0.0251*** 0.0132* 0.0141*   0.0243*** 
 (0.00917) (0.00704) (0.00764) (0.00762)   (0.00537) 
Manufacturing GSP -7.81e-06 -1.58e-05*   -4.96e-06 -5.66e-06  
 (1.04e-05) (8.89e-06)   (9.70e-06) (9.08e-06)  
Constant -2.138* -1.312* -2.819*** -1.676* -1.583 -1.065 -1.246*** 
 (1.193) (0.760) (0.689) (0.915) (1.035) (0.732) (0.455) 
        
Observations 351 516 352 352 373 538 528 
        
Pseudo R-squared 0.1102 0.1184 0.0682 0.0764 0.1144 0.1049 0.0806 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The statistical modeling presented in Table 1 and 2 indicate my overall analysis strategy.
 
13
 
14
 Both of these tables first present full models that include all variables. However, since 
variables such as citizen ideology and ambient air quality standards, new source pollution 
standards, and ambient air quality are correlated (Potoski 2001), the reduced models eliminate 
some variables to reduce collinearity in the models. Additionally, since the variables that could 
promote the construction of new coal power (like GSP, coal production, electricity prices, total 
railway, and manufacturing from GSP) could correlate with the number of existing coal power 
units, they are presented in different reduced models. This is especially important since none of 
the variables are statistically significant in the full model in Table 1.  
These results indicate that more stringent state New Source Performance Standards 
influence the number of applications filed in a state, but other state air quality regulations are not 
associated with new coal power. Across all models in Table 2, as the stringency of New Source 
Performance Standards increases, the number of applications submitted in a state decreases. The 
evidence for this relationship and the coal power capacity in an application is less clear because, 
as Table 1 indicates, only Reduced Model 2 replicates a similar finding. Despite evidence of 
state NSPS associated with new coal power applications, for the most part there is no association 
between a state’s ambient air quality standards (Table 1, Reduced Model 3 only meets 
hypothesis expectations), and ambient monitoring.  
                                                          
13
 Note that the sample size in each model for both tables because related Clean Air Act regulations data does not 
apply to all 50 states.  
14
 All reduced models are all possible combinations of the variable existing power units, CAA regulations (AAQ, 
Ambient Monitoring, and NSP), economic variables that explain coal siting, and citizen ideology. Since there is a 
possibility of correlation between all of these variables, all possible combinations were presented for both dependent 
variables.  Only the population variable is controlled for in all models to account for state size and normalize states 
for proper comparison.  
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 There is also some evidence that more liberal states receive fewer coal power 
applications and smaller increases in proposed capacity. Table 1 indicates strong evidence of 
citizen ideology influencing the size of the proposed new coal applications. More liberal states 
are associated with applications containing fewer megawatts. However, there is only modest 
evidence that the number of applications in a state per year is associated with state citizen 
ideology. Only three of the six models in Table 2 indicate that more liberal citizenry correlates 
with the number of permits in a state per year.  
 The analysis presented here provides some empirical evidence that firms intentionally 
apply for new coal power in states with weaker state air quality standards, which confirms a 
portion of the RTTB hypothesis. The strongest evidence is confirmed when firms apply less in 
states with stronger New Source Pollution standards. Additionally, firms target more 
conservative states with their larger coal power projects. This suggests that firms are concerned 
with the regulatory environment for their facilities and wish to site in jurisdictions which cost 
less to comply with environmental standards.  
Limits to Research/Future Directions 
 
Organizations that generate coal power consist of both private and public entities, which 
limit some of the explanatory power of this analysis. Private investors, independent power 
producers, cooperatives, the federal government and public utility firms all own power plants. 
Despite this limitation, in 1995 almost seventy-five percent of utility sales and total generation 
comes from investor-owned utility companies (Warkentin 1998). In 2010, almost eighty percent 
of all generated electricity comes from non-public entities, such as investor-owned utilities and 
independent power producers, while only around twenty percent of electricity came from 
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cooperatives, public utilities, and the federal government (American Public Power Association 
2012). This suggests that power generation is mostly controlled by for-profit entities that are not 
necessarily constrained by state or county borders like public utilities or cooperatives. However, 
it is revealing that, while there is a mixture of private and public entities utilizing coal for power, 
regulatory contexts still matter no matter the type of owner. Future studies should further dissect 
the relationship between type of owner and their response to regulatory environments.  
The role of differing parts of state government and the public also needs to be 
investigated. Future studies need to delineate how the legislature, executive, interest groups, and 
the bureaucracy influence the NSR process. Previous scholars indicate the ability of industry to 
work with bureaucrat officials. The question remains: is cooperation uniform across the 
ideological spectrum of regulators? Also, public comments or hearings on the new source 
permits are available to the public. Scholars have noticed the variety of public participation that 
occurs with various types of open public access for participation in administrative decision-
making, and fear that only interest group members attend certain forms of participation (Fiorino 
1990).  How does the layout of a public utility commission influence the application process? 
What about a governor’s appointment of a head of a state environmental agency? How does the 
public- through the help of interest groups- interact with this process, and do they have any 
influence? All these questions need to be addressed to fully understand how state politics and 
regulation influence owners’ decision-making. 
Finally, applications for permits may be the answer to why there is such a lack of past 
evidence for the RTTB hypothesis, which may suggest a research path forward. As the review 
process for application progresses, proposals may drift away from the original intention. Interest 
groups can get involved in the public commenting process on the permit, economics shift, or 
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industry revises the application for other reasons. This variation in the permitting process alone 
indicates that industry’s decision-making is not necessarily best represented by the final result of 
this fluid process. Future research needs to explore this process to fully explain firm behavior.  
Conclusion 
 
 Research indicates that states do not uniformly “race-to-the-bottom” on environmental 
regulations to attract businesses and when left to their own devices do improve air quality 
regulations (Potoski 2001). My findings complicate this narrative and provide evidence that 
utility companies do invest in coal power in states with less strict written regulations or potential 
for further regulations. States that increase their standards on new sources of pollution have an 
effect on the decision-making process at least in the initial stages of coal power development. 
Despite certain CAA regulations having little influence on siting decisions, considerations are 
taken for rules that directly influence a power plant’s emissions. The RTTB literature indicates a 
variety of results, but this study adds further evidence that the regulatory environment created by 
a state does affect industry’s decision-making. The investigation of electricity provides a chance 
to investigate the RTTB phenomenon with a product where the location of the facility is fixed, 
but produces a commodity that can travel hundreds of miles. Information from the permitting 
process of business provides a different investigation of industries’ behavior. Past regulatory 
behavior of standard influences plans for new power.  
This evidence also suggests that state citizen ideology also influences owners’ decision-
making. Officials in liberal states are more likely to develop policy viewed as pro-
renewable/anti-fossil fuel and/or further develop it in the future, or they are less flexible 
enforcing regulations. This suggests that businesses are aware of the political environment in 
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which they site new investments. Additionally, firms view more politically liberal states as 
potentially incurring more costs through the permitting process, existing and future 
environmental regulations, and they will modify their behavior to respond to these costs.  
There has been optimism concerning the ability for states to experiment, exceed federal 
standards, and enforce their own environmental regulations, and potentially produce better air 
quality by the states; but this claim warrants more pessimism. When given the opportunity, 
utilities essentially bypass those states that impose perceived costs upon their investments. The 
ability for public and private companies to move their product and/or production facilities across 
borders allows for a targeted strategy, which could neutralize the goal of reducing pollution by 
the adoption of a stricter regulatory environment. States can adopt strict pollution standards but 
still obtain a tangible benefit (i.e. electricity) from neighboring states with coal-fired power 
plants. However, this suggests the limits of state regulation to improve state air quality. If 
regulations push coal-fired power plants to neighboring states, this potentially negates any gains 
from some states adopting more strict standards in the first place.  
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Appendices 
 
Table 7: Variable Table 
Variable Measurement 
Number  Number of applications in a state for construction of coal power plant, boiler or unit. 
Included if there is a data of application, which means that the EPA received the 
application. Based on a modification of EPA’s National Coal Project.  The following link 
is in active, but the dataset is available upon request. 
http://www.epa.gov/region07/air/nsr/spreadsheets/national_coal_projects.xls 
 
Size  Size of proposed plant, boilers or units in application by state and year by megawatt 
electrical (natural log). Based on a modification of EPA’s National Coal Project.   
Included if there is an increase in capacity for each application.  The following link is in 
active, but the dataset is available upon request. 
http://www.epa.gov/region07/air/nsr/spreadsheets/national_coal_projects.xls  
Ambient Air 
Quality 
Standards 
Ambient Air Quality Standards (0-6). Sum of 6 pollutant measures. 0=Minimum national 
standards across all pollutants, 6 = states more restrictive pollutants. Data adapted from 
Potoski (2001). 
New Source 
Performance 
Standards 
State NSPS Standards. 0= EPA regulates (state awaiting USEPA authority) or  state 
standards identical to USEPA, 1=state standards more restrictive. Data adapted from 
Potoski (2001). 
 
Ambient 
Monitoring 
State Ambient Monitoring Standards. 1= Identical to USEPA standards, 2= Somewhat 
more extensive, 3= Much more extensive. Data adapted from Potoski (2001). 
Gross State 
Product 
Gross State product by state from 1999 to 2009. Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
Population  Number of people. 1999-2009 by state. Census Bureau. State Intercensal Estimates 
(2000-2010). Population Estimates. 
http://www.census.gov/popest/data/intercensal/state/state2010.html 
Coal 
Production 
Coal Production( thousand short tons) from 1999-2009. EIA. 2010.  State Energy Data 
System. 
 
 
Electricity 
Price  
Electricity average price, all sectors.  Dollars per million Btu by state from 1999-2009. 
Energy Information Administration.  
Citizen 
Ideology 
0-100 scale. 0= Very Conservative. 100= Very Liberal. Adapted from Berry et al. (2007). 
Years 2007-2009 are 2006 repeated. Berry et al. 2007.  
Railway Total rail miles in 2009 by state. Association of American Railroad's Profiles  
of U.S. Railroads. 
Number of 
Existing 
Coal Power 
Units 
Total number of facility units with the primary fuel type of coal. 1999-2009. 
Manufacturi
ng GSP  
Gross State product from Manufacturing by state from 1999 to 2009. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. 
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Table 8: Descriptive Statistics 
      
VARIABLES Sample  Mean Standard 
Deviation  
Minimum  Maximum  
      
Number 550 0.205 0.615 0 7 
Gross State Product 550 236,516 286,336 15,722 1.912e+06 
Population 550 5.837e+06 6.409e+06 479,602 3.696e+07 
Citizen Ideology 550 52.47 15.80 8.450 95.97 
Coal Production 539 22,759 62,375 0 467,644 
Ambient Air Quality Standards 418 6.395 2.087 0 12 
New Source Performance Standards 385 1.086 0.439 0 2 
Ambient Monitoring 407 1.811 0.730 0 3 
Railway 550 2,793 1,922 0 10,405 
Electricity Price 549 23.73 8.838 11.72 85.78 
Number of Existing Coal Power Units 528 22.27 20.62 0 83 
Size 78 6.517 0.942 3.761 9.196 
Manufacturing GSP 550 29,858 33,792 771 217,384 
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Chapter 3: Effectiveness of state GHG Targets 
 Livin’ on a Prayer? Gauging the effectiveness of State GHG Emission Reduction Policies 
 Over the past two decades, states adopted important climate change policies to reduce 
state carbon dioxide emissions. State reduction targets were adopted by states as one policy tool 
to move toward mitigation. Twenty states adopted emission targets for emitters of GHGs which 
included an emission baseline to gauge performance, a percentage of emissions goal benchmark 
based on that baseline, and a year in which to meet that goal. These policies are used to gauge 
the performance of public and private actors in the mitigation of the major contributions to 
climate change.  
 However, the importance of “target” policies extends beyond the U.S. governance of the 
climate, and this type of goal structure remains common in gauging the effectiveness of both 
private and public actors in protecting the environment and achieving public policy goals. Often 
governments set up statutory “goals” or “targets” to encourage mitigation efforts. Previous 
international treaties, like the Kyoto treaty, set up GHG targets for member countries to achieve 
by a certain year. Similarly, the United States federal government proposed and adopted a Clean 
Power Plan in 2014 to decrease carbon pollution from power plants by thirty percent of 2005 
levels by 2030. Part of this plan sets different goals for each of the states to reduce pollution 
from their power sector.
15
   
                                                          
15
 Please note: these power plant emission goals are different than the reduction policies in question in this research. 
http://www2.epa.gov/carbon-pollution-standards/fact-sheet-clean-power-plan-framework 
http://www.c2es.org/federal/executive/epa/carbon-pollution-standards-map Additionally, these types of targets are 
distinct from targets for certain facilities and firms. For example, many Renewable Portfolio Standards place 
mandates in large utility companies to achieve certain renewable energy goals by a certain time. Individual firms are 
held accountable for their behavior. The current GHG targets only set general goals for pollution reduction.  
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To further understand the role of targets in public policy and policy analysis, this study 
answers several interrelated questions. While target policies are used to gauge the performance 
of private and state actors in the mitigation of factors contributing to climate change, do these 
policy goals have an impact on how individuals behave? Specifically, do more ambitious state 
GHG emissions targets spur reductions in GHGs from states across economic sectors?  
Utilizing a combination of data from the Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program (GHGRP) 
and the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (C2ES), this study analyzes the relationship 
between targets and reductions in carbon dioxide emissions. I create an ‘ambitiousness’ measure 
to gauge the extent of each state’s target emission reductions per year. Controlling for state 
economic and political conditions, and past carbon dioxide emissions, this study finds that more 
ambitious state GHG targets are associated with lower state-level carbon dioxide emissions. 
However, this relationship is absent when evaluating at the facility-level.  
Literature Review  
 
Regulation of Air quality and Carbon Dioxide in the United States  
 
Historically, federal and state governments governed the air quality through 
collaboration; however, greenhouse gases remained outside this regulatory regime. Under the 
Clean Air Act of 1970, both the federal and state governments developed and implemented air 
quality regulations, which apply to the six criteria pollutants common in the United States 
(Ringquist 1993). However, the EPA did not include carbon dioxide in this initial list of 
regulated pollutants. As scientific and political concerns over the problem of carbon dioxide and 
other greenhouse gases came to fruition in the Nineties, many scientists and politicians called for 
66 
 
the federal government to join an international treaty to address the problem of global climate 
change. 
Despite initial efforts to establish mitigation programs and targets, federal efforts fell 
short. By the late Nineties, President Clinton signed the Kyoto Protocol, an international 
agreement that would have required the United States to reduce its Greenhouse Gases by seven 
percent below 1990 emission levels by 2012.  However, the Kyoto protocol was considered 
“dead on arrival” in the US Senate, and the United States failed to ratify the treaty. Under the 
Bush administration, the president continued to push for voluntary approaches, and disengaged 
from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 by deciding that the U.S. would not take steps to ratify and 
implement the treaty targets by 2012 (Clémençon 2008).  
Federal climate change policy consisted mostly of voluntary mechanisms in the Nineties 
and early 2000s, states decided to take their own policy routes.  Many officials saw the federal 
policies to address climate change as inadequate, and many regional, state, and local actors 
adopted policies in a “bottom-up governance” approach to climate mitigation policy (Rabe 
2004). After the federal government pulled out of the Kyoto protocol, many states adopted their 
own policies and goals for GHG reductions.   
Between 2001 and 2011, states adopted climate action plans or non-binding portfolios of 
policy recommendations to fit their state’s environmental and economic needs. These policies 
consisted of five different processes: calculating emissions, adopting targets, developing policies, 
implementing measures, and monitoring results (Wheeler 2008). To meet targets, states adopted 
different strategies that included increasing building efficiency, expanding renewable energy, the 
creation of forests and soil protection programs, promotion of more efficient vehicle use, more 
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efficient power plants, improved waste management, and develop biomass and nuclear fuels 
(Pollak et al. 2011). Within these climate action plans, some states adopted climate GHG targets 
or goals, which set certain reduction expectations.  
Each state adopted unique GHG targets through different governmental processes and 
rates and tailored to their different climate reduction objectives. Many states adopted these goals 
through state executive orders, executive directives, or the legislature. All states who adopted 
reduction goals, adopted climate action plans. However, not all states with climate action plans 
set emission reduction goals. By 2009 32 states had adopted climate action plans, of which only 
20 had adopted specific state reduction goals. These reduction goals consist of one to three 
reduction phases in the future (often the year 2020 or 2050), based on a past emissions baseline 
(often the year 1990 or 2000). For example, in 2006 Arizona adopted an executive order which 
established a statewide goal to reduce Arizona's GHG emissions to 2000 levels by 2020, and 50 
percent below 2000 levels by 2040.  
While states took an active approach in the adoption of climate mitigation policies, the 
empirical evidence of the effectiveness across all states is quite limited. While there is a robust 
collection of literature evaluating the effectiveness of international treaties on air pollution in 
general (see: Aichele and Felbermayr 2013; Al Doyaili and Wangler 2013) and sulfur dioxide 
emissions (see: Ringquist and Kostadinova 2005), there is little research on the effectiveness of 
American public policy on carbon dioxide emissions. Only Drummond (2010) investigates state 
climate change policies and carbon dioxide emission reductions, and Barbour and Deakin (2012) 
investigate the influence of California’s Senate Bill 375 on the state’s reductions efforts.  
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Drummond (2010) provides the best evidence evaluating the effects of state policy on 
nationwide emissions, but this previous research is limited for several empirical and 
methodological reasons. First, it omits industrial-based carbon dioxide emissions from analysis. 
Second, the data used in this study through the Energy Information Administration is based only 
on indirect estimates of only two-thirds of state carbon dioxide emissions. Finally, GHG targets 
in Drummond (2010) are measured dichotomously, when there is variation in the expectations 
for these state policies. For example, a reduction of 20% in California is different than a 20% 
reduction in Vermont. The Energy Information Administration reports that in 1990, Vermont’s 
total carbon dioxide emissions were 5.49 million metric tons per year, while California’s were 
363 million. Treating each of these reduction goals as equals does not provide an effective cross-
comparison.  
Program evaluation  
 
Beyond the immediate question of whether GHG targets are effective in the reduction of 
carbon dioxide emissions, it is important to embed GHG target reduction policies within the 
broader literature of program evaluation and public policy to understand their purely voluntary 
and evaluative role. Vedung (2008) describes evaluation as a time in which officials determine 
how well the administrative process is turning out, whether outcomes are obtained by 
intervention, and whether more cost-efficient ways can assist in reaching a goal. Essentially, 
evaluation is a time for learning and adjustment. During this time of reflection and change, 
individual behavior may change in response to policies before future intervention or changes 
occur (Vegung 2008). 
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GHG targets qualify as evaluation policies adopted to evaluate the progress of each state, 
and therefore reflect an interest from state actors in determining whether or not the state is 
progressing as planned. Higher expectations in GHG targets during the evaluation process could 
indicate more desired outputs in the policy process, mainly due to the role of information in 
producing outcomes for private actors. Therefore, businesses may act even before mandatory or 
voluntary programs intervene in the emission of GHGs because targets may be a signal to 
businesses of the inevitability or strength of future GHG regulations. So, in essence, targets 
could be used as reference points in order to adopt or modify existing/future climate change 
policies or modify polluting behavior.  
Hypotheses 
 
This study evaluates two related hypotheses concerning GHG targets and emissions in 
order to unravel the conflicting evidence that suggests the effectiveness of state reduction plans. 
On one hand, the underlying programs attempting to meet these reduction goals might be flawed. 
Scholars have criticized state officials for making inadequate policy recommendations, being 
unable to fully implement existing recommendations, and failing to fully provide resources for 
climate action plans (Wheeler 2008). There is reason to believe that while states may adopt 
ambitious goals for reduction, a state may have no direct policy mechanisms to reduce emissions. 
On the other hand, other evidence indicates state GHG targets produce emission changes. 
Drummond (2010) finds empirical evidence that states with reduction plans reduce more non-
industrial emissions than those who do not have these targets. Additionally, Aichele and 
Felbermayr (2013) indicate that the Kyoto Protocol produced reductions in carbon dioxide 
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emissions despite the voluntary, non-enforceable nature of the agreement.
16
 This is due to 
member countries summarizing and reporting their emissions annually, which impacts the 
country’s political process and encourages reduction results.  
Hypothesis #1a: States with more ambitious reduction policies have lower carbon dioxide 
emissions than those with less ambitious ones.  
Hypothesis #1b:  Facilities in states with more ambitious reduction policies have larger carbon 
dioxide emission reductions than those with less ambitious ones.  
 
Dataset, Methods, and Variables 
 
This study uses two different types of statistical analysis for two levels of carbon dioxide 
data. For state-level analysis, this study uses Pooled Cross-Sectional Time Series Analysis 
because there are time variant and invariant variables. Since there is a chance for a correlation 
between standard errors across time and space I correct for this statistical problem with panel-
corrected standard errors. The second level of analysis is facility-level. Since facility-level data 
aggregated to the state-level is limited in variation and explanatory power, this study uses 
Ordinary Least Squares to analyze change in emissions from 2011 and 2013 at the facility-level.  
The following variables measure the influence of GHG targets on carbon dioxide 
emissions (for both levels). Figure 1 provides a conceptual framework in order to provide clarity. 
 
 
 
                                                          
16
 The Kyoto Protocol legally bound member states to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. However, Aichele and 
Felbermayr (2013) note that  these requirements were less stringent than presented on paper.   
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Figure 2: Conceptual Mode for influence of numerous state level variables on state C02 
emissions 
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Dependent variables 
 
I use two different dependent variables to understand the relationship between ambitious 
GHG targets and carbon dioxide emissions.
17
 First, facility emissions are aggregated to the state 
level from 2010 to 2013 from the GHGRP. Second, I investigate the change in facility-level 
emissions from 2011 to 2013 from the same dataset. This dataset covers direct emissions data 
from over 7,000 facilities across nine economic sectors (power plants, petroleum and natural gas, 
refineries, metals, chemicals, waste, and other facilities). This is superior to previous carbon 
dioxide data in that it covers over eighty to ninety-five percent of all GHGs emissions,  provides 
direct emission counts, and is reported at the facility-level. While previously Drummond (2010) 
only utilizes state-level carbon dioxide estimates from the Energy Information Administration, 
which is limited in scope and level of analysis.
18
 
Independent variables 
 
 While it is typical of past policy research to operationalize policy adoption or policy 
implementation in strictly dichotomous terms, this study joins other scholars who move beyond 
this limited type of measure. Other studies incorporate key policy designs to build metrics of 
policy stringency when dealing with Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) (see: Carley and 
Miller 2012; Wiser and Barbose 2008; Fischlein 2010). The approach of Carley and Miller 
(2012) is the most straight forward and intuitive way in which to address stringency. Carley and 
Miller (2012) develop a RPS stringency measure based on 1) if a state has adopted a RPS policy, 
                                                          
17
 For more information on each variable, see the Variables chart in the appendices.  
18
 EIA data is based solely on estimates of carbon dioxide emissions from residential, commercial, and electricity 
sources from 1990 to 2013. This state data does not provide direct measurements of major polluters. So, this level of 
analysis restricts variation since its calculation is at the state-level, instead of the facility-level.  
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2) whether the policy is voluntary/non-binding or mandatory, 3) the stringency based on the final 
RPS mandate minus the starting RPS mandate, divided by the number of years between the final 
mandate year and the starting mandate year, multiplied by the RPS coverage of the state’s energy 
market. 
 I also construct an ambitiousness index based on portions of this measure from Carley 
and Miller (2012).
19
 This measure is built from state carbon emissions data from the Energy 
Information Administration from 1990 to 2010 and information from C2es concerning the 
adoption year and emission baseline years.
20
 GHG emission targets designate an emissions 
baseline to compare future changes to emissions, a percentage by which to reduce emissions, and 
a year to meet that deadline—often across different phases for reduction. The following formula 
represents the percentage of emission reductions per year, averaged across phases.  
(((𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑠) − (𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙))
÷ (# of years between adoption and goal)))
÷ (EmissionLevels at time of adoption) 
Table 1 indicates the final average amount of reductions per year for each state (averaged across 
phases) to meet each state goal (organized from largest to smallest).
21
 
 
 
                                                          
19
 This measure differs in that it does not include voluntary versus mandatory reductions, and it also averages across 
multiple phases.  Some may argue that the California GHG emission target is a mandatory target—requiring 
emission reductions and enforcing non-compliance. However, this policy does not put individual targets on 
facilities—so compliance is only mandated through other rules adopted by California Air Resources Board.  
20
 Since the GHGRP only goes back to 2010, I use EIA to construct this measure. While EIA is flawed, it still 
provides the necessary data to approximate the ambitiousness of each state GHG targets because it covers the 
temporal scope of both the adoption years of GHG targets and the emission baseline years mentioned in each policy.  
21
 Raw outputs in descriptive statistics vary from this table mainly because zeroes are dropped to clarity purposes.  
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Table 9: State GHG Target Goals Standardized 
State Average Percent 
Change Per Year 
(across all phases)  
Connecticut 4.8428 
Colorado 4.2109 
Vermont 3.6256 
Maine 3.5428 
Oregon 2.3522 
Rhode Island 2.0201 
Minnesota 1.763 
Maryland 1.6941 
Illinois 1.5829 
New Jersey 1.5806 
Florida 1.4151 
Arizona 1.3397 
New Hampshire 1.3225 
Michigan 1.1938 
Washington 1.1816 
Massachusetts 0.9366 
New Mexico 0.9062 
California 0.8965 
Hawaii 0.8636 
New York 0.1141 
 
Controls 
 
There are also several economic, political, policy, and past emission measures to control 
for other influences on carbon dioxide emissions. To start, state economic conditions are 
important indicators of the emission of carbon dioxide.  
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 Gross State Product (GSP). Previous literature on the Kuznets curve indicates that 
there is a curved relationship between carbon dioxide emissions per capita and the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of nations. While initially GDP increases carbon dioxide emissions, 
there is a point when economic expansion decreases carbon dioxide emissions at the national 
level (Aichele and Felbermayr 2013). The basic premise is this: as economies grow, so does air 
pollution. However, after a point, nations begin to invest in air pollution controls. Using similar 
reasoning, this study uses Gross State Product to control for this effect at the subnational level. 
States and facilities within states with larger GSP should correlate with decreases in the total 
emissions and increase reductions.  
GSP from Manufacturing. While there is a complicated relationship between GDP and 
emissions, manufacturing is much more carbon intensive (Aichele and Felbermayr 2013). 
Therefore states and facilities with more carbon intensive industries should correlate with higher 
levels of emissions and smaller reductions. This study controls for manufacturing though GSP 
from manufacturing to take into account economic dependency of carbon intensive industries. 
 Population. To control for the state size of population and surrounding changes in 
population, this study controls for state population size. Aichele and Felbermayr (2013) find that 
there is a correlation between increases in population and carbon dioxide emissions. With more 
population, demands for energy and economic development increase. Similarly, we use state 
population estimates by year to control for these population shifts and to compare across states.  
Citizen Ideology. Political factors should also play a role in amount of carbon dioxide 
emissions. Previous scholars find a correlation between state carbon dioxide emissions and the 
percent of voters for a Democratic presidential candidate, primarily because this indicates a 
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public concern for the environment, and thus pressures a reduction in carbon dioxide emissions 
(Drummond 2010). Similarly, this study uses a citizen ideology measure to gauge public concern 
for climate change and the mitigation of carbon dioxide emissions. A state with a more liberal 
citizenry should be associated with lower state carbon dioxide emissions and larger facility 
reductions.  
Number of Environmental Groups. Environmental interest groups could influence 
carbon dioxide levels and the magnitude of reductions. Past scholars indicate that number of 
green groups in a state could influence air quality policy (Potoski 2001). Therefore, interest 
group pressure could impact firm emission behavior directly through utility lobbying pressure or 
indirectly through state regulators, and as a result the more environmental interest groups 
registered in a state should result in fewer carbon dioxide emissions. This study uses a measure 
constructed by adding all the C-20 (pollution abatement and control) registered groups in a state 
from 2012 to 2014.  
Climate action plans. Additionally, a state’s regulatory environment through major 
voluntary and mandatory climate policies should impact emissions. Proponents argue that 
voluntary programs are more pragmatic and elastic in achieving environmental gains, while 
opponents argue that these programs are barriers to more effective and strict, mandatory 
programs (Pizer, Morgenstern, and Shih 2008). However, the previous empirical evidence 
indicates that climate action plans, a voluntary approach, should produce pollution reductions. 
Drummond (2010) finds a relationship between the adoption of state action plans and reduction 
of state per capita carbon dioxide emissions across residential, commercial, and transportation 
sectors. In a similar vein, this study uses a measure that indicates whether a state adopted a 
climate action plan or not.  
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Mandatory “Cap and Trade” Programs. Many states adopted policies to place specific 
limitations on certain industries that contribute to GHG emissions. The most significant way 
states attempted to limit greenhouse gas emissions is through state mandatory “cap and trade” 
programs for the power industry. These programs set strict limits on the amount of allowable 
GHG emissions from power plants, and creates a trading system of pollutant allowances. Past 
scholars indicate that the Acid Rain Program, which used a market-based “cap and trade” 
mechanism, significantly reduced sulfur dioxide emissions in the United States (Schmalensee 
and Stavins 2012). Therefore, similar “cap and trade” programs should have a similar impact on 
state carbon dioxide emissions.  
Previous C02 emissions. Finally, past state and facility emissions behavior should 
influence the behavior of future carbon dioxide emission levels.  The current analysis omits 
facility level controls, which could potentially miss a large predictor of changes in past polluting 
behavior. To compensate for this lack of facility-level variables, this study includes estimates of 
state-level carbon dioxide before the start of analysis.
22
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22
 For the state-level analysis, I use data from the EIA from 2009 in order maximize the amount of variation on the 
dependent variable for years 2010 to 2013.   
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Results 
 
Table 1: Ambitiousness of GHG Targets and Aggregated State C02 emissions  
 
 Model 1: Model 2: 
DV: State-level C02 
emissions 
 
 
All States 
(2010-2013) 
Only States w/ 
Targets (2010-2013) 
   
Emissions-EIA (2009) 1,091** 1,340 
 (423.9) (807.8) 
Ambitiousness Target -4.798e+06*** -2.821e+06*** 
 (1.039e+06) (1.035e+06) 
Climate Action Plan -35,687  
 (47,819)  
Manufacturing  -1.967*** -2.268*** 
 (0.744) (0.713) 
Population 0.0727*** 0.0490*** 
 (0.00973) (0.0138) 
Cap and Trade -65,144*  
 (35,379)  
Citizen Ideology 1,140 -6,925*** 
 (1,335) (1,818) 
Environmental Groups -62.36 -165.0 
 (90.85) (158.4) 
Gross State Product -1.293*** -0.770*** 
 (0.150) (0.120) 
   
Constant 424,626*** 815,384*** 
 (55,756) (145,821) 
   
Observations 200 80 
R-squared 0.452 0.755 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 1 reports the analysis of facility emissions aggregated to the state-level. The results 
from Model 1 indicate that ambitiousness is strongly negatively correlated with fewer carbon 
dioxide emissions—as the GHG target ambitiousness increases, state carbon dioxide emissions 
decrease. Most economic controls meet expectations—except for manufacturing. Increases in 
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GSP correspond with decreases in emissions, and increases in population increase emissions. 
However, contrary to expectations, manufacturing is associated with decreases in emissions.  
The policy controls indicate that while “cap and trade” policies, which are mandatory reduction 
policies, are associated with lower carbon dioxide emissions, climate action plans are not 
associated with lower emissions. As expected, past emissions in state correspond with future 
emissions activity, and increases in reported state emissions from 2009 increase with emissions 
from 2010 to 2013. 
Model 2 investigates emissions from the only states that have GHG targets to check if the 
results deviate significantly from the first model. These results almost mirror the ones from the 
first model.
23
 Amongst states with targets, the more ambitious states correlate with less carbon 
dioxide emissions. Also, while there is no statistically significant relationship between EIA 
emissions and aggregated state GHGRP emissions, the more liberal states among those that have 
adopted GHG targets emit less total emissions.  
Despite the strong results from Table 1, there is difficulty determining the causal 
direction between carbon dioxide emissions and ambitious GHG targets.
24
 The state-level 
analysis fails to answer whether states with more ambitious targets emit less carbon dioxide 
emissions or if states with lower carbon dioxide emissions adopt more ambitious GHG targets. 
 
 
                                                          
23
 Both “Cap and Trade” and “Climate Action Plans” are dropped due to collinearity. Almost all states who have 
adopted GHG reduction targets adopted climate action plans and/or cap and trade policies.  
24
 Previous chapters indicate a modest relationship between the adoption of GHG reduction targets and carbon 
dioxide production. 
80 
 
Table 2: Ambitiousness of GHG Targets and Facility C02 emissions 
DV: Facility-level Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions 
Model 3: Model 4: 
 Change in Emissions w/ 
previous emissions  
(2011-2013) 
Change in Emissions (2011-
2013) 
   
Carbon Dioxide Emissions (2010) -0.0643***  
 (0.00270)  
Ambitiousness Target 771,708 979,253* 
 (585,416) (576,403) 
Climate Action Plan 6,162 3,181 
 (14,190) (13,807) 
Manufacturing (2011) 0.176 0.174 
 (0.229) (0.229) 
Population (2011) -0.00856* -0.0153*** 
 (0.00471) (0.00472) 
State Cap and Trade -43,088* -43,815* 
 (26,151) (26,025) 
Citizen Ideology -671.7 -659.6 
 (553.9) (545.2) 
Number of Environmental Groups 56.08* 70.42** 
 (30.09) (29.77) 
Gross State Product (2011) 0.126 0.239*** 
 (0.0873) (0.0874) 
Constant 19,297 -9,625 
 (22,386) (21,842) 
   
Observations 5,254 5,781 
R-squared 0.101 0.004 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Further facility-level analysis presented in Table 2 indicates a more complex relationship 
between GHG targets and facility-level emissions. In Model 4, there is a modest relationship 
between states with more ambitious GHG targets carbon dioxide emissions—however, in the 
opposite direction of the expected result (negative relationship indicates larger reductions). 
Additionally, Model 3 indicates, with the inclusion of past emissions behavior, ambitiousness no 
longer correlates with reductions in carbon dioxide emissions.   
 Additionally, facility-level controls present a different outcome than the previous models. 
Model 3 and 4 indicate no relationship between manufacturing, climate action plans, and citizen 
ideology and reductions in carbon dioxide emissions. Also, the models indicate a relationship 
between number of environmental groups and GSP, and facility emission reductions are smaller 
in states with more environmental groups and GSP--which is contrary to expected results.  
However, facilities reduce more carbon emissions if they are located a state with a “cap and 
trade” program. 
Discussion 
 
 The results here indicate that at first glance, GHG targets seem to correlate with lower 
state carbon dioxide emissions. However, there is reason to question this assessment. The more 
rigorous model (Table 2, Model 1), which uses facility-level emissions while controlling for past 
facility behavior is better because it explains much more of the variation of the dependent 
variable (.101 in Model 3 compared to .004 in Model 4). Additionally, it incorporates variables 
beyond the state-level and provides measures for facility-level activity. The more rigorous model 
suggests that there is no relationship between the ambitiousness of GHG targets and emission 
reductions. However, using such a conservative estimate may underestimate the role of GHG 
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targets, and one must view these results with caution (see: Limits to Research for more). If one 
were to accept the idea that GHG targets produce no tangible emissions reductions, then 
conceptually it makes sense to view those states with more ambitious targets as adopting plans 
because there is a smaller problem (i.e. lower carbon dioxide emissions) to address.  
Overall, these results indicate a difference in emission reduction performance between 
state mandatory and voluntary policies. This evidence suggests that the voluntary mechanisms 
through climate action plans intended to meet reduction goals are not adequate in decreasing 
emissions. The failure to find any relationship between adoption of climate action plans and 
carbon dioxide emissions runs contrary to some past empirical evidence (Drummond 2010). 
However, considering previous criticisms, it should not be surprising. As previously mentioned, 
these climate action plans often are “low-hanging” voluntary policies, mainly adopted to 
improve economic opportunities, and  these policies suffer from a lack of resources and full 
implementation (Wheeler 2008).  However, the temporal scope of this analysis may prevent a 
full assessment of the effectiveness of these measures, and further research is needed. 
On the other hand, while one may question the effectiveness of both climate action plans 
and reduction targets, the evidence here suggests that state “cap and trade” programs do produce 
changes in firm polluting behavior. Although, it is entirely possible that both of these variables 
are rather blunt, future research should add more nuance to explain the relationship between 
these policies and emissions. 
Limitations and future research 
 
 There are several methodological and empirical challenges that should be addressed in 
future drafts of this research and other scholarly work. First, there are inherent limitations in 
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determining if the policy itself is the cause of change in the dependent variable. Previous studies 
on the effects of environmental policy indicate that data trends before the time of adoption can 
mask the true effect of policies. Ringquist and Kostadinova (2005) found that that participating 
countries in the Helsinki Protocol reduced pollution faster than nonparticipants; however, the 
reduction trend existed prior to adoption of the treaty and continued the a  decrease in emissions 
without the program. Unfortunately, the Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program does not report 
GHG emissions before 2010 to conduct a trend analysis of pre-adoption pollution. Future 
versions of this research could solve this problem by narrowing the data to power plants and 
incorporating data from the Clean Air Market Program with the GHGRP data, which would 
identify carbon dioxide trends before the extant analysis. 
There are also ways in which to improve the methodological approach to this study. 
Future studies need to develop a more nuanced dependent variable by dividing it by sector and 
including other GHG emissions provided in the GHGRP dataset. In this analysis, all emissions 
are aggregated by sector and only include carbon dioxide. However, the GHGRP data includes 
divisions across sector and includes other GHGs, such as methane. It could be important to 
evaluate reductions across pollutant and economic sector. Future analysis needs to incorporate 
more facility-level variables and modify the ambitiousness measure. Currently, the use of past 
year’s emissions is a very crude and conservative test of all other variables. Much of the 
variation on the dependent variable is explained by past emissions. However, other measures 
such as owner and facility production data would clarify the facility level analysis by refining 
what influences the emission of pollution and what does not.   
Conclusion 
 
84 
 
The current chapter initially asked the question of whether state GHG targets are 
effective in producing tangible changes to polluting behavior. Viewing these policies as 
evaluation policies, evidence presented here indicates the clear symbolic nature of more 
ambitious state GHG targets. Furthermore, this suggests that these policies have no direct impact 
on emissions activity, and perhaps these policies are useful in holding public officials 
accountable. Rather, states with more liberal citizens and smaller carbon dioxide emission 
problems are more likely to adopt these policies. While these GHG targets are for evaluation 
purposes, there is a disconnect between emissions activity and the emission goals of public 
officials, businesses, and other individuals involved overseeing carbon pollution. Perhaps it is 
better to evaluate GHG targets in a framework beyond a traditional outcome-based paradigm. 
While GHG targets may not provoke officials or industry to reach the intended goals, perhaps 
these policies are useful in holding public officials accountable for their lack of action. Future 
research should look at whether failure to meet certain goals and targets actually changes 
election results or impacts public support for candidates.   
Ultimately, the evidence casts doubt upon the ability of states to address the mitigation of 
GHGs on their own. The underlying problem with how states address the mitigation of climate 
change is that, while they make ambitious targets and adopt outlines to develop climate 
mitigation programs, both the proposals are inadequate and/or the implementation of policies 
never occurs. Although there is evidence that state cap and trade programs result in larger 
emission reductions, only a limited number of states adopted these mandatory programs. And 
even though it is a political challenge, if states want to motivate businesses to reduce their 
pollution, then it is perhaps more expedient to adopt policy mechanisms that have some capacity 
to hold businesses accountable rather than adopting targets that are limited in effectiveness.  
85 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References  
 
Aichele, R. and G. Felbermayr (2013). "The Effect of the Kyoto Protocol on Carbon Emissions." 
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 32(4): 731-757. 
Al Doyaili, S. and L. Wangler (2013). "International climate policy: does it matter? An empirical 
assessment." Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy 2(3): 288-302. 
Aldy, J. E. (2006). "Per capita carbon dioxide emissions: convergence or divergence?" 
Environmental and Resource Economics 33(4): 533-555. 
Aldy, J. E. (2007). "Divergence in state-level per capita carbon dioxide emissions." Land 
Economics 83(3): 353-369. 
Aldy, J. E. (2007). "Energy and carbon dynamics at advanced stages of development: An 
analysis of the US states, 1960-1999." The Energy Journal: 91-111. 
Barbour, E. and E. A. Deakin (2012). "Smart Growth Planning for Climate Protection: 
Evaluating California's Senate Bill 375." Journal of the American Planning Association 
78(1): 70-86. 
86 
 
Bennear, L. S. (2007). "Are management‐based regulations effective? Evidence from state 
pollution prevention programs." Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 26(2): 327-
348. 
Borck, J. C. and C. Coglianese (2009). "Voluntary environmental programs: assessing their 
effectiveness." Annual Review of Environment and Resources 34: 305-324. 
Carley, S. and C. J. Miller (2012). "Regulatory stringency and policy drivers: A reassessment of 
renewable portfolio standards." Policy Studies Journal 40(4): 730-756. 
Clémençon, R. (2008). "The Bali road map A first step on the difficult journey to a post-Kyoto 
protocol agreement." The Journal of Environment & Development 17(1): 70-94. 
Daley, D. M. (2007). "Voluntary approaches to environmental problems: exploring the rise of 
nontraditional public policy." Policy Studies Journal 35(2): 165-180. 
Drummond, W. J. (2010). "Statehouse Versus Greenhouse: Have State-Level Climate Action 
Planners and Policy Entrepreneurs Reduced Greenhouse Gas Emissions?" Journal of the 
American Planning Association 76(4): 413-433. 
Fischlein, M. L. (2010). Renewable energy deployment in the electricity sector: Three essays on 
policy design, scope, and outcomes, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA. 
Gray, W. B. and J. P. Shimshack (2011). "The effectiveness of environmental monitoring and 
enforcement: A review of the empirical evidence." Review of Environmental Economics 
and Policy: req017. 
Howard, G. J. (1999). "Garbage laws and symbolic policy: Governmental responses to the 
problem of waste in the United States." Criminal Justice Policy Review 10(2): 257-290. 
87 
 
Jiusto, S. (2006). "The differences that methods make: Cross-border power flows and accounting 
for carbon emissions from electricity use." Energy Policy 34(17): 2915-2928. 
Koehler, D. A. (2007). "The Effectiveness of Voluntary Environmental Programs—A Policy at a 
Crossroads?" Policy Studies Journal 35(4): 689-722. 
Lyon, T. P. and E.-H. Kim (2006). "Greenhouse Gas Reductions or Greenwash?: The DOE's 
1605b Program." The Doe's 1605b Program (November 2006). 
Lyon, T. P. and J. W. Maxwell (2007). "Environmental Public Voluntary Programs 
Reconsidered." Policy Studies Journal 35(4): 723-750. 
Maggioni, E., et al. (2012). "Industry Influence in Stakeholder‐Driven State Climate Change 
Planning Efforts." Policy Studies Journal 40(2): 234-255. 
May, P. J. (2005). "Regulation and compliance motivations: Examining different approaches." 
Public Administration Review 65(1): 31-44. 
Metcalf, G. E. (2008). "An empirical analysis of energy intensity and its determinants at the state 
level." The Energy Journal: 1-26. 
Moon, S.-G. and S. Bae (2011). "State-Level Institutional Pressure, Firms' Organizational 
Attributes, and Corporate Voluntary Environmental Behavior." Society & Natural 
Resources 24(11): 1189-1204. 
Pizer, W., et al. (2008). "Evaluating voluntary climate programs in the United States." Resources 
for the Future RFF DP: 08-13. 
88 
 
Pollak, M., et al. (2011). "Reducing greenhouse gas emissions: Lessons from state climate action 
plans." Energy Policy 39(9): 5429-5439. 
Potoski, M. and A. Prakash (2005). "Covenants with weak swords: ISO 14001 and facilities' 
environmental performance." Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 24(4): 745-
769. 
Potoski, M. and A. Prakash (2013). "Do Voluntary Programs Reduce Pollution? Examining ISO 
14001's Effectiveness across Countries." Policy Studies Journal 41(2): 273-294. 
Potoski, M. and A. Prakash (2013). "Green clubs: Collective action and voluntary environmental 
programs." Annual Review of Political Science 16: 399-419. 
Rabe, B. G. (2004). Statehouse and greenhouse : the emerging politics of American climate 
change policy. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press. 
RAMIREZ HARRINGTON, D. (2013). "Effectiveness of state pollution prevention programs 
and policies." Contemporary Economic Policy 31(2): 255-278. 
Ringquist, E. J. and T. Kostadinova (2005). "Assessing the effectiveness of international 
environmental agreements: The case of the 1985 Helsinki protocol." American Journal of 
Political Science 49(1): 86-102. 
Schmalensee, R. and R. N. Stavins (2012). "The so2 allowance trading system: The ironic 
history of a grand policy experiment." 
Shanti Gamper-Rabindran, S. R. F. (2009). "Does industry self-regulation reduce pollution? 
Responsible Care in the chemical industry? ." Journal of Regulatory Economics 43(1): 1-
30. 
89 
 
Vedung, E. (2008). Public policy and program evaluation, Transaction Publishers. 
Welch, E. W., et al. (2000). "Voluntary behavior by electric utilities: Levels of adoption and 
contribution of the climate challenge program to the reduction of carbon dioxide." 
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 19(3): 407-425. 
Wheeler, S. M. (2008). "State and municipal climate change plans: the first generation." Journal 
of the American Planning Association 74(4): 481-496. 
Young, O. R. (2001). "Inferences and indices: evaluating the effectiveness of international 
environmental regimes." Global Environmental Politics 1(1): 99-12.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
Appendices  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
      
State Mean of C02 
Emissions 
200 467,790 235,995 20,317 1.243e+06 
Number of 
Environmental Groups 
200 370.7 361.5 49 2,254 
Climate Action Plan 
Adoption 
200 0.760 0.428 0 1 
Citizen Ideology 200 47.43 15.35 18.07 86.18 
Manufacturing from 
GSP 
200 39,326 46,247 1,242 239,008 
Gross State Product 200 313,471 377,925 26,570 2.203e+06 
Population 200 6.242e+06 6.911e+06 564,222 3.833e+07 
State  C02 Emissions 
2009 (EIA) 
200 107.5 105.0 6.097 626.4 
Ambitiousness of State 
GHG Targets 
200 0.00748 0.0120 0 0.0484 
State Cap and Trade 
Adoption 
202 0.203 0.403 0 1 
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Variable  Description  
 
State-level GHG Emissions (2010-
2013) 
Average state carbon dioxide emissions 
per year (aggregated from facility-level). 
Source: Greenhouse Reporting Program 
Facility-level GHG emissions (2011-
2013) 
Facilities-level GHG carbon dioxide 
emissions. Source: Greenhouse 
Reporting Program. 
Ambitiousness Measure of Target 
adoption 
Source: C2es and Energy Information 
Administration 
GSP (2010-2013) Gross State Product per capita.  
 Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Population (2010-2013) Raw population numbers by state. U.S. 
Census.  
Citizen Ideology (2010) 0-100 scale. 0= Very Conservative. 
100= Very Liberal. Adapted from Berry 
et al. (2007). Constructed from the 
electorate’s perceived ideal ideological 
fit with Congressional candidates’ 
ideology.  
GSP from Manufacturing  (2010-
2013) 
Gross State Product from the 
Manufacturing sector.  Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. 
State mandatory Cap and Trade 
program 
Whether state adopted a mandatory state 
level cap and trade program. Source: 
C2es. 
State Climate Change Plan Whether state adopted a climate action 
plan. Source C2es.  
Environmental Groups in a state Total number of C-20 Pollution and 
Abatement groups registered between 
2012 and 2014. Source: National Center 
for Charitable Statistics 
State C02 emissions (2009) Total carbon dioxide emissions by state 
(Million metric tons). Source: EIA 
Source 
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Conclusion 
 
 Throughout this dissertation I sought to explore the role of state governments in the 
adoption and implementation of air quality regulations, along with the response of private actors 
to these regulations. I show that the optimism expressed by scholars in the state’s role in air 
pollution may be overstated. Each of these cases suggests a more cautious approach when 
understanding the capabilities of state air quality regulation.  
 In chapter one, I explored the relationship between state political and economic 
conditions and the adoption of GHG tracking and reduction policies. Using Event History 
Analysis, I found several relationships between state adoption and internal state factors—the 
strongest being citizen liberal ideology and adoption. Ideology plays such a large role in 
adoption that certain policies, such as GHG targets, are adopted only by certain very liberal 
states. With a few exceptions, other external factors through ideological and geographical 
proximity play no role in the adoption of these policies.  
 Businesses also may respond by trying to avoid air quality regulations. I sought to 
investigate whether the RTTB hypothesis properly explained the influence of state air quality 
regulations on the siting of new coal power. By looking at information from the national coal 
project, which provides information on permitting behavior between 1999 and 2009, I used 
Negative Binomial and OLS to analyze firm behavior. Controlling for economic conditions and 
past coal siting behavior, I found that business modify the size and number of applications for air 
quality permits for coal power. They apply to more and for larger increase power capacity in 
states with more conservative citizens and less stringent CAA air quality regulations. 
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 Finally, in chapter three, I found that firms may even ignore certain air quality 
regulations. I consider whether the state adoption of GHG targets reduces a state’s carbon 
dioxide emissions under the auspices that this type of evaluation policy produces changes to 
individual firm behavior. Initially, I found a negative relationship between a state’s adoption of 
more ambitious GHG targets and state-level emissions in the GHGRP data. However, further 
facility-level analysis shows no relationship between ambitious targets and the size of emission 
reductions. Instead, state “cap and trade” programs were associated more consistently with 
carbon dioxide emission reductions.  
 I found throughout this dissertation that while many states adopted more stringent air 
quality regulations, state political conditions dominated this policy process. Most important of 
all: not all states adopted climate change policies. Only more liberal states were likely to adopt 
voluntary GHG inventories, climate action plans, GHG reduction targets, and more stringent 
CAA regulations.  Additionally, even moderately liberal states were reluctant to adopt more 
ambitious GHG targets. This suggests that even though some states adopted these policies, they 
responded unevenly to the problem of air pollution.   
 Problems associated with state adoption of climate change policies are compounded 
further when states who contribute the least to climate change are those most likely to adopt 
more ambitious GHG targets and “cap and trade” programs.
25
 This suggests that even though 
states have the ability to develop legislation to mitigate factors contributing to climate change, 
these solutions may not be present in states who significantly contribute to the problem in the 
first place.  
                                                          
25
 Many adopters of “cap and trade” programs are small, lower emitter states in the Northeast.  
94 
 
 Even if states adopt more climate mitigation policies this does not necessarily mean that 
they modify businesses’ behavior. There is evidence that the adoption of GHG targets did not 
produce tangible decreases in carbon dioxide. Additionally, although large states like California 
and New York developed effective “cap and trade” programs, which seem to have made some 
tangible impact on carbon dioxide trends in their states, businesses still attempted to avoid more 
stringent regulations when possible. This is evident in the siting of coal-fired power plants over 
the last decade. Utilities site in states with the minimum standard of new sources of pollution and 
more conservative states where the regulatory environment is less stringent. 
These cases indicate some instances of the inability of states to meet the demand of air 
pollution on their own.  Although there is reason to be hesitant about the achievements of state 
governments in regulating their air quality, this dissertation should not be read as an outright 
indictment of their efforts to reduce air pollution. Federal and state cooperation led to massive 
reductions in the CAA criteria air pollutants. This study does not suggest that state governments 
play no role in the regulation of air pollution, only that regulators should be aware of the limits 
of these governments when allowing them to develop their own policy.  
Perhaps the ideal relationship consists of state and federal governments working together 
on air quality. For example, while utilities want to site coal-fired power plants in states with less 
stringent regulations, the federal government prevents state governments from going below 
certain standards for the main criteria pollutants under the CAA. This suggests that while the 
states can assist the federal government in implementation of future air quality regulations, the 
EPA can work with the states to produce a regulatory environment that produces ideal policy 
outcomes into the future.  
